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HOME STATE, CROSS-BORDER
CUSTODY, AND HABITUAL
RESIDENCE JURISDICTION: TIME
FOR A TEMPORAL STANDARD IN
INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW

TODD HEINE*

ABSTRACT
This article addresses three jurisdictional standards that arise in every
cross-border child custody dispute between European Union Member
States and the United States: home state, cross-border, and habitual
residence jurisdiction. These jurisdictional standards face uncertainty in
many cases.
First, this article provides a history of family law jurisdiction in the
United States and thoroughly reviews home state jurisdiction in United
States domestic law. While domestic family lawyers know this standard,
the standard’s rigidity and fragmented application among the states
baffle many foreign family lawyers.
Second, this article offers an overview of the remarkable emergence of
family law in European Union law, chronicling the history of crossborder jurisdiction as a treaty matter to the present day status of family
law jurisdiction under European Union law. This article reviews the
recent Court of Justice of the European Union and United Kingdom court
decisions on habitual residence, which leave an uncertain standard for
habitual residence determinations in custody disputes.
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Third, this article reviews habitual residence jurisdiction in custody
disputes under private international law. After reviewing the relevant
treaties, this article examines cases in seven jurisdictions to show the
uncertain jurisdictional standard that remains, despite habitual
residence’s supposed uniformity.
After analyzing these cases, this article proposes a time-based,
categorical standard for habitual residence jurisdiction determinations.
Private international law needs a uniform standard for the growing
number of cross-border custody disputes. A temporal standard would
make habitual residence determinations more certain, which would in
turn benefit children, parents, and courts.
I.

INTRODUCTION

International family law reflects deeply personal stories about children,
parents, and courts. Most cross-border cases, however, showcase a dry
protagonist: jurisdiction. Jurisdiction can be complex in a modern,
mobile, multicultural world and may involve national, international,
interstate, intergovernmental, and state law. Determining jurisdiction
can present a legal maze.
Section II of this article begins by reviewing United States family law
jurisdiction with a focus on today’s “home state” jurisdiction. In a sense,
United States family law begins and ends with bright line tests. Today,
jurisdiction exists primarily in the child’s “home state” – a time-based
concept.
In contrast, European custody jurisdiction largely lacks time-based
standards. Section III examines European Union family law’s gradual
development. In the European Union, jurisdiction primarily turns on
“habitual residence,” which can be a vague, uncertain, and jurisdictionspecific standard.
Private international family law also turns on habitual residence. Section
IV reveals this term’s uncertainty by examining two Hague conventions
and case law regarding habitual residence. Thus, Sections II through IV
strive to achieve this article’s first goal: to provide a broad understanding
of child custody jurisdiction within these three frameworks, side-by-side.
This comprehensive look at the primary jurisdictional factors illuminates
a need to concretize jurisdictional determinations with a firmer standard.
Accordingly, this article’s second goal, fulfilled in Section V, is to
provide more legal certainty for all families in cross-border custody
disputes by proposing a new standard in private international family law
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– a temporal standard complemented by categorical definitions for
temporary presence in a jurisdiction.

II.

FROM FATHER’S RIGHTS TO HOME STATE JURISDICTION
UNDER THE UCCJEA

In the United States, each of the 50 states generally follows its own
family laws.1 For child custody jurisdiction, however, broad uniformity
exists under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act (“UCCJEA”).2 The UCCJEA embodies three centuries of evolution.
This Section explains United States family law history, the UCCJEA,
and home state jurisdiction in several domestic states.
A.

UNITED STATES LAW BEFORE THE UCCJA

1.

EARLY HISTORY

Child custody determinations in the United States have changed
drastically over the past three centuries. During most of the 18th
century, fathers in North America had “an almost unlimited right to the
custody of their minor legitimate children.”3 This preference gave way
during the legal and cultural shift after the American Revolution, when
laws in the United States challenged fathers’ rights, recognizing the
important role of mothering in child development.4
Using common law, judges took the reins in family law as a matter of
social policy.5 The courts’ role in family law stemmed from the English
parens patriae doctrine, which provided jurisdiction in the name of the
king to oversee transfers of feudal duties.6 In the 1800’s, courts used this
doctrine to intervene in familial disputes to protect the best interest of the
child.7

* J.D., Vermont Law School, LL.M. and Master 2 Droit, Université de Cergy-Pontoise
(France). The author thanks Professor Gregory Johnson for legal writing assistance and Professor
Armand de Mestral for guidance on European Union law. The author would like to thank his
mother, grandmother, and family for their love and support.
1
See generally, LESLIE HARRIS, FAMILY LAW (Aspen 2009).
2. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 9 U.L.A. 649 (1997).
3. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 235 (The University of North Carolina Press 1985).
4. Id. (citing Bedell v. Bedell, 1 JOHNSON’S CHANCERY REP. 605 (N.Y. 1815) (granting
custody to mother instead of alcoholic father).
5. Id. at 6 – 9, 14, 18.
6. Id. at 235.
7. Id. at 239.
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The best interest of the child is a key concept in family law. 8 This
longstanding principle permeates family law internationally.9 The best
interests of the child is “[a] standard by which a court determines what
arrangements would be to a child’s greatest benefit….”10 Though courts
do not single-handedly define this standard.
United States society in the early 1800’s, concerned about leaving
familial legal problems solely in judges’ hands, called upon state
lawmakers to intervene. Marriage, viewed only in part as a private
contract, was squarely under state control.11 State lawmakers shaped law
and policy by codifying the balancing tests that state courts used to
determine custody.12
These standards differed from state to state.13 As a result, parents would
seek the friendliest venue for custody disputes, as evident in the
publicized D’Hauteville case.14 In that case, the mother secured custody,
in a Pennsylvania court because Pennsylvania was “a maternal custody
haven.”15 Since the mid-1800’s, parents have forum shopped for state
custody laws.
As state custody laws developed, commentators sought unified family
law principles. Early family law treatises in the United States attempted
to synthesize family law.16 However, such uniformity failed because,
following popular and professional preference, judges shaped the statespecific codified family law.17 Thus, in practice, courts retained the
leading role in this area of law for the rest of the nineteenth century.

8. Prather v. Prather, 4 S.C. Eq. 33 (S.C. Ct. App. 1809) (granting custody to mother based on
child’s interest despite the strong presumption for father’s custody rights).
9. Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in
American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 338 (2008).
10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
11. GROSSBERG, supra note 3 at 239. See also, Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflicts
of Law (Boston 1834) (describing marriage as “something more than a mere contract. It is rather to
be deemed as an institution of society founded upon the mutual consent and contract of the parties,
and in this view has some obligation, different than what belongs to ordinary contracts.”
12. GROSSBERG, supra note 3, at 239.
13. Id.
14. COMMONWEALTH OF PA., REPORT OF THE D’HAUTEVILLE CASE (Philadelphia 1840).
15. GROSSBERG, supra note 3, at 241.
16. Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce (1852); James
Schouler, Law of Domestic Relations (1870).
17. GROSSBERG, supra note 3, at 241.
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In time, yearly divorces in the United States increased nearly fivefold
from 1890 to 1920.18 In response, state legislatures regulated custody
determinations. By 1936, all states had codified their own custody
laws.19 As state courts applied their unique family law statutes, their
orders had the potential to clash with other state courts’ orders.20
2.

PROBLEMS WITH JURISDICTION

In 1953, a child custody case of conflicting jurisdiction offered the
United States Supreme Court a rare chance to address custody
jurisdiction. In May v. Anderson,21 a mother kept her three children in
Ohio despite a Wisconsin court’s ex parte order that granted the father a
divorce and custody of the children.22 An Ohio state trial court held that
it was constitutionally bound to give full faith and credit to the
Wisconsin order and ordered the children’s return.23
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the Ohio court had to
honor the Wisconsin court’s order, which lacked personal jurisdiction.24
Thus, the Court’s analysis turned on whether a state court had to
recognize another’s custody order that lacked personal jurisdiction.25
In previous cases, the Court held that personal jurisdiction was
unnecessary for divorce because divorce was purely a status
determination.26 However, courts needed personal jurisdiction over both
parties to order financial support, because such orders involved property
rights.27 The Court extended this reasoning because “[r]ights far more
precious … than property rights [would] be cut off if [the mother was]
bound by the Wisconsin award of custody.”28 As a result, courts could

18. MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF
CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 112 (Columbia University Press 1994) (reporting an
increase in divorces from 33,461 – 167,105 during these years).
19. Id. at 114 (citing CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, 4 vols. (Stanford
University Press 1936); see Id., at 24-54, Table of State Laws.
20. See, e.g., Harmon v. Harmon, 111 Kan. 786 (Kan. 1922); Sorge v. Sorge, 112 Wash. 131
(Wash. 1920); Twohig v. Twohig, 176 Wis. 275 (Wis. 1922); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 154 Ark. 401
(Ark. 1922); McNeir v. McNeir, 76 Misc. 661 (N.Y. 1911); Smith v. Frates , 107 Wash. 13 (Wash.
1919).
21. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
22. Id. at 529.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 531.
25. Id. at 533.
26. Id. at 533-34 (citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 542 (1948); Krieger v. Krieger, 334 U.S.
555 (1948)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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ignore orders if the previous court lacked personal jurisdiction over both
parties.
Justice Jackson’s dissent in May anticipated problems that this decision
would create with conflicting orders.29 The dissent would have held that
the father’s and children’s presence gave the Wisconsin court custody
jurisdiction.30 Though custody rights were indeed more precious than
property rights, Jackson viewed custody as a status issue that “Wisconsin
Justice Jackson
had a far more real concern with” than Ohio.31
recognized the decision’s effect as follows:
The Wisconsin courts cannot bind the mother, and the Ohio
courts cannot bind the father. A state of the law such as this,
where possession apparently is not merely nine points of the law
but all of them and self-help the ultimate authority, has little to
commend it in legal logic or as a principle of order in a federal
system.32
Otherwise stated, after May v. Anderson, a parent faced with future
divorce proceedings in one state could preemptively move to a new state
and obtain a custody order. If the other spouse got a conflicting order in
another state, the parent who took the children to the friendlier venue
could simply ignore a conflicting order. In this event, the only solution
remaining was child abduction, which courts could legally sanction with
further conflicting orders. As this article will illustrate, Justice Jackson’s
dissent presciently predicted problems that lawmakers would address.
Moreover, that case demonstrated that jurisdiction in interstate child
custody matters was on the national radar by the 1950’s. With increased
mobility and the divorce revolution of the 1960’s on its way, courts
needed uniform guidance on interstate jurisdiction. 33 Without full faith
and credit, May v. Anderson encouraged forum shopping in the United
States – the first of three reasons that catapulted forum shopping and
child abduction into pressing national problems.
The second reason was flexible jurisdictional requirements for custody
disputes.34 Wide jurisdictional bases made jurisdiction in multiple courts
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 538.
Id.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 539.
See GROSSBERG, supra note 3, at 224.
SANFORD N. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF
CHILDREN 14 (ABA Press1981).
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an unfortunate possibility. Courts variously exercised jurisdiction based
on the child’s physical presence, the child’s domicile, one or both
parents’ domicile, original jurisdiction, the best interests of the child, or
parens patriae.35 Thus, for mobile families, conflicting orders were
readily available.
The third reason was that new bases for jurisdiction could arise because
of custody decrees’ inherent uncertainty and lack of finality. Parents
could often take their cases before a new court, which would exercise
jurisdiction and modify another state court’s existing order.36 When that
occurred, competing orders caused enforcement nightmares and
jeopardized the child’s best interests.37 In response to these jurisdictional
conflicts, the states had to collaborate.
B.

THE UCCJA

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(“National Conference”) is the primary United States institution that
designs and monitors the interstate legal system.
Over 300
commissioners represent their states and collaborate to support the
federal system, modernize laws, and facilitate legal issues.38
Pursuing these aims in family law in 1968, the National Conference
completed the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”).39
The UCCJA addressed child abductions and conflicting orders “to bring
some semblance of order into the existing chaos.”40 Generally, the
UCCJA bound courts to enforce other state court orders. However,
states could adopt their own versions of the UCCJA. Eventually, all
states adopted the UCCJA’s four jurisdictional factors.
The first factor that provided jurisdiction involved a judicial
determination of the child’s “home state,” a term that the UCCJA defined
concretely – if somewhat arbitrarily.41 The child’s home state was the
“state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent for at least six

35. Id.
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id.
38. See, Uniform Law Commission, “About the ULC,” at http://www.nccusl.org/
Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC..
39. See Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. __ (1968).
40. Id., Prefatory Note.
41. Id § 2(5).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011

7

16

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 17 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 5

16

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XVII

consecutive months.”42
standard in most cases.

This objective definition provided a clear

Under the second factor, the UCCJA provided jurisdiction if the child
and at least one parent had a “significant connection” with the state,
based on “substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future
care, protection, training, and personal relationships” in the state.43
UCCJA comments indicated home state would take priority over
significant connection.44
With the third jurisdictional factor, the UCCJA attempted to extinguish
parens patriae, jurisdiction based solely on the child’s best interests, by
making it available only in exceptional cases of child abandonment or
emergency.45 Lastly, courts could exercise jurisdiction if no other court
had jurisdiction on the previous three bases.46 These four jurisdictional
bases simplified interstate jurisdiction, but over time they would add
complexity to the UCCJA’s application.
Problems arose because states could adopt their own versions of the
UCCJA. This meant that state courts applied jurisdictional bases
differently. Some courts made home state jurisdiction primary, others
put it on par with significant connection.47 Conflicting orders persisted.
As time passed, federal laws affected interstate custody disputes.
Congress passed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,48 the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act in 1986,49 and the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994.50 Each law related to custody and
conflicted somewhat with the UCCJA,51 leaving the latter clumsy and
outdated.52

42. Id.
43. Id. § 3(a)(2).; Id. § 7(c)(3).
44. See id. § 3, Comment.
45. Id. § 3(a)(3).
46. Id. § 3(a)(4).
47. See, e.g., Harris v. Melnick, 552 A.2d 38 (Md. 1989).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (West 2011).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (West 2011).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 13925-14045d (West 2011).
51. See,, e.g., Danny Veilleux, What types of proceedings or determinations are governed by
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA), 78 A.L.R. 1028 (1990).
52. Robert G. Spector, International Child Custody Jurisdiction and the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 251, 257 (citing FINAL
REPORT: OBSTACLES TO THE RECOVERY AND RETURN OF PARENTALLY ABDUCTED CHILDREN
(Linda Gardner & Patricia Hoff eds., 1993).
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In light of these conflicting laws, persistent potential for conflicting
orders, and the differing applications of the UCCJA among the states, the
National Conference established a new uniform act – the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”).
C.

THE UCCJEA

1.

GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE UCCJEA

After almost 30 years of the UCCJA, the National Conference acted
again to streamline jurisdiction. In 1998, the National Conference passed
the UCCJEA.53 Today, the UCCJEA applies in every state except
Once adopted by these two state
Vermont and Massachusetts.54
legislatures, the UCCJEA will unanimously set a uniform jurisdictional
standard.
The UCCJEA governs custody matters related to “divorce, separation,
neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of
parental rights, and protection from domestic violence.”55 It also covers
international cases, expressly treating foreign nations as U.S. states.56 In
all of these cases, a court will first determine whether the child has a
home state.
Home state remains the primary jurisdictional factor under the UCCJEA.
The term retains its six-month time-based definition.57 A home state
court has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over parental responsibility
matters.58 Courts can get jurisdiction exceptionally in other limited
cases.59 Personal jurisdiction and presence are not required.60 A party
cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction.61 Thus, the UCCJEA provides a
rigid standard for initial jurisdiction.
Another type of jurisdiction is modification jurisdiction. The UCCJEA’s
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction is a distinct trait in contrast to
53. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 9 U.L.A. 649 (1997).
54. State enactments do, however, vary from the Uniform Act. See Unif. Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, Variations from Official Text, 9 U.L.A. 46-62 (2001).
55. The UCCJEA does not cover adoption or tribal proceedings. Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC’s
of the UCCJEA: Interstate Child-Custody Practice Under the New Act, 32 FAM. L.Q. 267 (1998).
56. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, supra note 53 § 105(a)–(c). The
NCCUSL modeled 105(c) after the Hague Convention. Hoff, supra note 55 (1998).
57. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, supra note 53 § 102 (7).
58. Id. § 202.
59. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, supra note 53 § 201, 207 – 208.
60. Id. § 201(a)(4)(C).
61. See, e.g., Foley v. Foley, 576 S.E.2d 383 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Seligman-Hargis v. Hargis,
186 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that UCCJEA is a subject matter statute).
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international and European Union jurisdiction. Continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction generally means that only the court that made a previous
order can modify that order.62 Two situations provide jurisdiction to
modify a previous court order.
First, if a child, parent, and person acting as parent have no connection
with the initial state, then a court in another state can modify previous
orders.63 As seen below, many United States courts strictly require a
court to determine a lack of connection with the previous state.
Second, temporary emergency jurisdiction exists “if the child is present
in this State and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of
the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.”64
Courts must communicate during simultaneous proceedings.65 Thus,
while exceptions exist, home state is the primary factor for interstate
jurisdiction.
INITIAL JURISDICTION

2.

A court exercises initial jurisdiction when it makes the first custody
orders in a given case. The UCCJEA provides jurisdiction with a bright
line definition of home state, which is:
[T]he State in which a child lived with a parent or a person
acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months
immediately before the commencement of a child-custody
proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the
term means the State in which the child lived from birth with any
of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any
of the mentioned persons is part of the period.66
This definition is almost entirely objective. Except for temporary
absence cases – a persistently uncertain standard seen throughout this
article – the place where a child has physically resided for six months
when a parent files suit is the home state. Consequently, the home state
court there will have exclusive jurisdiction, objectively providing
jurisdiction in most cases.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, supra note 53 § 202.
Id. § 203.
Id. § 204. This section conforms with the PKPA.
Id. § 204(d).
Id. § 102(7).
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“Immediately Before” or “Six Months Before?”

Awkward language in home state’s definition, however, created an
interpretation issue. The words “immediately before” suggest a short
time period between presence in the home state and the proceeding’s
commencement. However, the UCCJEA gives jurisdiction to the state
that:
[I]s the home State of the child on the date of the commencement
of the proceeding, or was the home State of the child within six
months before the commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this State but a parent or person acting as a
parent continues to live in this State.67
On its face, the UCCJEA left room to debate on home state’s definition.
For example, after Arizona adopted the UCCJEA, an appellate court
addressed this issue. In Welch-Doden v. Roberts, a mother and child had
moved back and forth between Oklahoma and Arizona, eventually
staying in Oklahoma for six months.68 The mother and child then moved
to Arizona, where she said they intended to remain.69 However, the
father never joined them in Arizona where, in four months, the mother
filed for divorce.70
The mother argued that the child had no home state.71 Because those
four months had passed, the child had not lived in Oklahoma
“immediately before” the proceedings.72 The court noted the potential
discrepancy and examined the UCCJEA’s purpose and background.73
The Arizona court sought to promote certainty, aiming “to strengthen
(rather than dilute) the certainty of home state jurisdiction.”74 As such,
“six months before” enlarged the definition of “immediately before,”75
meaning that “home state” persists for “six months before the

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. § 201(a)(1).
Welch-Doden v. Roberts, 42 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id at 1171.
Id.
Welch-Doden, supra note 68, at 1171.
Id at 1173.
Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011

11

18

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 17 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 5

20

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XVII

commencement of the [child custody] proceeding.” Therefore, despite
four months in Arizona, Oklahoma remained the child’s home state.76
This coherent interpretation workably defined home state. Quite simply,
if a child lived in a home state within six months before the proceedings,
courts in that state have jurisdiction. Many state courts have followed
this court’s interpretation.77 Thus, home state’s core definition applies an
objective, time-based standard.
(b)

Temporary Absence

This objectivity, however, wavers in temporary absence cases. The
UCCJEA states that time spent temporarily outside of a jurisdiction will
count toward time spent in the home state.78 This awkward concept
contains a legal fiction that corrodes the otherwise straightforward home
state standard. Unfortunately, temporary absence lacks any definition in
the UCCJEA. Consequently, courts have been less than uniform in
determining whether a move was temporary.
Under existing judicial definitions, several methods exist to determine
whether an absence is temporary.79 Courts variously use time, parental
intent, or the totality of the circumstances of the situation.80 These
differing standards dilute uniformity and inject subjectivity.
Some courts have avoided mind-reading exercises by focusing on the
time. One court rejected an argument characterizing “an absence, with
the exception of a few days, of almost seventeen months to be a
‘temporary’ absence.”81 Other courts have similarly looked at duration.82

76. Id at 1174.
77. See, e.g., Veecock-Little v. Little, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 75 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006); Stephens
v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct., 128 P.3d 1026, 1029 (Mont. 2006); Krebs v. Krebs, 960 A.2d 637, 644 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Rosen v. Celebrezze, 883 N.E.2d 420, 428 (Ohio 2008); In re B.N.W., No.
M2004-02710-COA-R3-JV, 2005 WL 3487792, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec 20, 2005); Christine L.
v. Jason L., 874 N.Y.S.2d 794, 797(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2009).
78. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, supra note 53§ 102 (7).
79. See T.H. v. A.S., 938 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. App. 1997).
80. See infra.
81. In re Marriage of Sareen, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 687, 695 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
82. See, e.g., Ogawa v. Ogawa, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (Nev. 2009) (holding time-limited threemonth stay in Japan was temporary); Felty v. Felty, 882 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)
(holding despite her expressed intent to remain in Kentucky, child’s six-week presence there was a
temporary absence from the home state in New York); Chick v. Chick, 596 S.E.2d 303 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2004) (noting six week absence from Vermont “was a relatively short period of time,
especially when compared to the fact that the children had spent almost the entire previous year in
Vermont.”).
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This approach is logical for practical and legal reasons. Practically, a
child will integrate over time, regardless of parental intent. Legally, this
maintains home state’s time-based focus. Thus, courts should primarily
look at an absence’s duration to determine if it was temporary.
Many courts have instead primarily examined parental intent.83 Relying
on intent is chronically problematic because, in custody disputes, parents
often disagree in court about previous intent. These conflicting accounts
force courts to wade through facts regarding past states of mind. In the
end, courts must embrace only one parent’s alleged intentions.
Consider Shepard v. Lopez-Barcenas, an Oregon appellate case between
a Mexican mother and a father from the United States.84 Their child was
born in 1998 and lived in Mexico.85 The family moved to Oregon in
1999, where the mother pursued a one-year degree.86 One month into her
degree, the mother ended the relationship, telling the father that she
would move back to Mexico after her studies.87 In January 2000, the
father sought custody of their child in Oregon.88 After the mother waived
personal jurisdiction, the court gave the mother custody and the father
visitation rights.89
The father later tried to enforce those visitation rights in an Oregon
court.90 The court dismissed his case because the original court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.91 In affirming, the
appellate court held that the move to Oregon was a temporary absence
from the home state in Mexico.92 The father, however, argued that
because he intended a permanent stay in Oregon, the child did not have a
home state for six months before filing.93
The appellate court disregarded the father’s intent, pinning temporary
absence on the mother’s intent: “‘[a]ny temporary absence of any of the
mentioned persons’ is considered to be part of the period during which

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

For a totality of the circumstances approach, see, e.g., Chick, supra note 82.
Shepard v. Lopez-Barcenas, 116 P.3d 254 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Id.
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[the child] lived in Mexico.”94 The mother intended a temporary move;
her unilateral intent maintained Mexico as the home state.
On the facts, this outcome was correct. Parental intent aside, the family
moved to Oregon for the mother’s short-term educational endeavor. The
child had only been in Oregon for three months of a time-limited move
because the mother pursued a one-year degree.
However, the court’s analysis is problematic because, instead of focusing
on those facts, the court analyzed parental intent. Not surprisingly, these
parties claimed different intentions. Instead of looking to the objective
indicators in the case, the court’s ruling offered a unilateral power to
establish an absence’s temporary nature by asserting previous intent.
The decision was unfair because the court focused solely on the time
“during which [the] mother was temporarily absent”95 and her purported
intent regarding the child’s residence. Allowing one parent to decide
home state based on subjective intent creates uncertainty. This
subjective analysis encourages parties to litigate over intent. Further, this
blanket rule may not benefit the best interests of the child after extended
stays where a child fully integrates into a new home state despite one
parent’s subjective intent that the child’s presence was temporary.
Unfortunately, some courts have similarly looked to parental intent
regarding temporary absence, creating questionable results in cases with
extended “temporary” stays.96 Courts can instead determine temporary
absence based on concrete facts. As will be seen in Sections III and IV,
temporary absence’s trickiness begs for a firm definition internationally,
as well.
(c)

Newborns – Born into the UCCJEA

The UCCJEA handles one type of temporary presence with a categorical
rule for newborns. Sometimes, a mother will give birth and only intend
that the child remain in the state temporarily after birth. While this could
blur the home state determination, the UCCJEA provides a bright line
categorical standard for cases involving newborns.
For children under six months, “[home state] means the State in which
the child lived from birth with any [parent].” In Re Calderon-Garza, a
94. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.741(7) (West 2011).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g,, Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004); Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos,
176 F. Supp.2d 1037, 1044 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
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case coming out of Texas, involved a mother who left Mexico to give
birth in Texas.97 The mother enjoyed dual United States-Mexican
citizenship and stayed at her parents’ home in the United States before
giving birth to her son.98 Eleven days after the birth, she notified the
father, who visited from New Jersey.99 The mother and child stayed five
months in Texas before going to Mexico.100 The day after they left, the
father filed for paternity in Texas.101
Despite the child’s one-day absence before filing, Texas was the child’s
home state immediately before the father filed for paternity.102 The
mother argued that the stay in Texas was only temporary as she
maintained a domicile in Mexico and intended to return after receiving
her family’s support.103
Instead of considering intent, the court noted that the child had never
been in Mexico and thus could not have been temporarily absent.104 The
mother’s intentions were irrelevant; living in a state meant only physical
presence.105 As such, Texas was the newborn’s home state.
This was sound reasoning. It displayed this bright line, categorical
standard’s strength on two levels. First, factually, an absence cannot be
temporary from a place where a child was never present. By deftly
avoiding the controversial issue of a fetus’ home state,106 the court ruled
out a fictitious absence, which follows the UCCJEA’s goal to promote a
clear standard.
Second, the analysis effectively solved a problem that the UCCJEA
addressed – home state for newborns. When parental responsibility
disputes arise so early that the child has not lived in a state for six
months, the newborn has unique interests. Unlike older children who
integrate in an environment, newborns are unlikely to integrate in the
same sense without school, activities, and the development of social and
familial relationships. The decision in In Re Calderon-Garza offers

97. In re Calderon-Garza, 81 S.W.3d 899, 900 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
98. Id. at 901.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 903.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Sandra E. Salas, In Re Calderon-Gaza: The Texas UCCJEA’s Reach to Unborn Children,
10 L. & BUS. REV. AM 435, 438 (2004).
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parents a measure of legal certainty regarding jurisdiction in cases over
newborns. It does so without slighting the best interests of children.
Moreover, this case demonstrates how a precise category for
jurisdictional determinations can provide certainty. After all, without the
UCCJEA newborn provision, this could have been a messy
determination. The court would have had to determine the child’s
significant connections because he had no home state or alternatively
entertained the temporary absence argument.
Fortunately, litigants in the United States face clear answers in newborn
cases. Noting how this specificity simplifies newborn cases, additional
categorical definitions of temporary absence could provide more
certainty, whether under the UCCJEA or international law.
(d)

International Initial Jurisdiction

As the above case subtly demonstrated, the UCCJEA applies
straightforwardly in international cases. It simply treats foreign countries
as states.107 This strict standard, like other strict standards, has worked
well by adding predictability to comity issues.108 Albeit straightforward,
this strict standard potentially burdens foreign courts and counsel. In
order to issue a recognizable order, foreign courts must have initial
jurisdiction under UCCJEA standards. Thus, if foreign courts do not
follow the UCCJEA, courts in the United States may not subsequently
recognize those foreign court orders.
An Indian court order faced such problems in In Re Marriage of
Sareen.109 In that case, a family lived in the state of New York and
traveled to India.110 Within one week of arriving in India, the husband
filed for divorce and custody after taking the mother’s and child’s
passports and residency documents.111 Over one year later, the mother
and child moved to California.112 Three months later, she filed for
divorce and custody in California.113

107. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, supra note 53 § 105(a)–(c). The
NCCUSL modeled 105(c) after the Hague Convention. Hoff, supra note 55 (1998).
108. D. Marianne Blair, International Application of the UCCJEA: Scrutinizing the Escape
Clause, 38 FAM. L.Q. 547 (2004).
109. 62 Cal Rptr.3d 687 (2007).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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In considering the previous Indian order, a California appellate court
examined whether the Indian trial court had initial jurisdiction.114 The
father argued that because Indian law provided jurisdiction, the
California courts could not exercise jurisdiction.115 However, the
California appellate court concluded that Indian law would not suffice –
India was a UCCJEA state.116
Because the father filed suit after only nine days in India, jurisdiction
there did not substantially conform with the UCCJEA.117 Furthermore,
the child’s time in India during the Indian court proceeding did not count
toward home state time.118 New York, not India, was the child’s home
state when he filed suit.119 As a result, the California court rejected the
Indian court order.
This case demonstrates that courts in foreign jurisdictions must follow
the UCCJEA. Based on the facts of the case, this decision was fair, but it
indicates that parties seeking custody in foreign courts face significant
hurdles. After all, foreign courts will not likely consider the UCCJEA’s
provisions. Nonetheless, they must follow the UCCJEA or risk having
their orders rejected in state courts. Similar problems arise when
modifying orders in foreign courts.
(e)

Modification Jurisdiction

Modification jurisdiction applies tight restrictions. Continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction gives the court with initial jurisdiction the exclusive power to
modify custody orders, even if a child acquires a new home state. A
court in a different jurisdiction can only modify another court’s order if
“neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a
person acting as a parent have a significant connection with the”
previous state or if “the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting
as a parent do not presently reside in” the previous state.120 Further, the
court must judicially determine that this factual situation no longer
exists.121

114. Id at 691.
115. Id at 690.
116. Id at 691.
117. Id.
118. See In re Marriage of Sareen, supra note 81, at 693 (citing Atkins v. Vigil, 59 P.3d 255
(Ala. 2002); Hegler v. Hegler, 383 So.2d 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), Irving v. Irving, 682
S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)).
119. Id.
120. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, supra note 53 §202.
121. Id.
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A 2007 New York case involved an Italian mother, an American father,
their son, and a court that missed this requirement.122 The mother and
child resided in Italy where an Italian court granted her full custody.123
In January 2005, the mother and child moved to New York.124
In August 2006, the mother petitioned a New York court for an order to
modify the Italian order to suspend the father’s visitation rights.125 In
March 2007, she took the child to Italy, violating the New York court’s
order that forbid the mother from taking the child.126 The father
continued the New York action, but the mother initiated another suit in
Italy.127 After the New York trial court confused the Abduction
Convention and the UCCJEA, issued a bogus arrest order, and ignored
the Italian order’s notification requirement, the court dismissed the
case.128
The appellate court held that the child’s home state was New York based
on his time spent there.129 Then, based on that holding, the court ruled
that the New York court had jurisdiction to modify the Italian order.130
Careful analysis reveals the error in this court’s decision.
Regardless of home state, a court cannot modify a previous order without
a judicial determination that no party resides or remains present in the
previous home state.131 In this case, no court made such a determination.
That missing step meant that, lacking jurisdiction, the New York court
lacked jurisdiction to modify the Italian court’s previous custody
arrangement.
Ignoring that formal requirement, the court presented a public policy
argument. Declining jurisdiction would have given “the mother a choice
of jurisdictions, and thus the concomitant right to disregard any orders of
the court of which she availed herself when she failed to obtain the

122. Michael McC. v. Manuela A., 848 N.Y.S.2d 147 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
123. Id. at 147.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. For more on the status of such orders call ne exeat orders, and their status under the
Convention, see Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. __, (2010). See also, TODD HEINE, “DOES A NE EXEAT
PROVISION CREATE RIGHTS OF CUSTODY UNDER THE HAGUE ABDUCTION CONVENTION?: THE
SUPREME COURT’S ELUSIVE QUEST FOR A BRIGHT LINE RULE IN ABBOTT V. ABBOTT,” available at:
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=todd_heine (2011).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, supra note 53 § 201.
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desired outcome.”132 The justification was unnecessary. Regardless of
policy, only courts with exclusive continuing jurisdiction can modify
orders. The court should have resolved the case within the UCCJEA’s
established structure instead of resting on its policy determination.
In buttressing this argument, the court further erred by citing case law
that dealt with the Hague Abduction Convention.133 Though the court
probably reached the right result, it did so by diluting the UCCJEA
requirements and confusing future courts. Judge Lippman verified in his
dissent more of the majority’s shortcomings when he observed that the
Italian custody proceeding began when Italy was indisputably the home
state of the child and continued with the still-pending appeal by the
father challenging the Italian court’s ruling for the mother.134 The
majority’s order, he pointed out, was “at the very least, premature.”135
The New York court should have waited for the Italian court’s ruling on
the case.
Other courts have gotten the issue right, recognizing exclusive
continuing jurisdiction’s far reach. The case of In Re Marriage of Nurie
involved “kidnapping, fraud, and domestic violence, all set against a
backdrop of INTERPOL warrants, armed gunmen, and flights from
justice,” but like most of these cases, “[t]he issue on appeal [was] the far
less dramatic one of jurisdiction under the [UCCJEA].”136 In this case, a
six-year-old divorce order provided exclusive, continuing jurisdiction in
the California courts, invalidating a Pakistani court order.137
Setting aside the case’s peculiar facts, the mother took the child to
Pakistan and secured custody under Pakistani law. The father, who spent
significant time in Pakistan but maintained a California residence, then
abducted the child and returned to California.138 In response, the mother
sought recognition of the Pakistani order in the California courts.139
The California appellate court held that when a parent maintains a
residence in the child’s previous home state, a court there that exercised
initial jurisdiction maintains exclusive continuing jurisdiction until any
court determines that all parties have stopped residing in that
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Michael McC., supra note 122.
Id. (citing Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (3rd Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 100 (Lippman, J., dissenting).
Id.
In Re Marriage of Nurie, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 200, 207(Cal. Ct. App.).
Id at 221.
Id at 209 - 210.
Id.
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jurisdiction.140 Therefore, the court disregarded the Pakistani court orders
because the Pakistani court did not consider, let alone determine, whether
the father gave up his residence in California.141 The failure to meet this
requirement preserved California’s exclusive jurisdiction after six years.
This strict application offers legal certainty by requiring a record that all
parties left the previous jurisdiction. However, it threatens foreign
custody modifications that do not follow the UCCJEA. While some
courts are flexible if evidence undeniably shows that both parties have
left the previous home state,142 an adversary without a court
determination risks the inability to modify.143 Here again, foreign courts
must follow the UCCJEA to modify custody. To foreign counsel, this
may seem unfair because they will not likely know UCCJEA
requirements. This perceived unfairness would benefit from aligned
international standards in cross-border cases.
To counsel in the United States, however, the required determination
provides an extra measure of legal certainty because a court may not go
forward with an order to modify without removing obstacles to
modification. Thus, the UCCJEA’s required court determination is yet
another bright line test to increase legal certainty in custody jurisdiction.
(f)

Conclusions About Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA

In sum, the UCCJEA contains several bright line tests to determine home
state. Home state is the place where the child lived the previous six
months. The court in the home state where the child lived within six
months before filing has exclusive initial jurisdiction. Less clearly, a
temporary stay in a state counts toward time in the home state. For
children less than six months of age, their home state is the state in which
they have lived since birth. When state courts consider foreign courts’
custody orders, the foreign courts must have had initial jurisdiction under
the UCCJEA for the state courts to recognize the foreign orders.
If a court exercises initial jurisdiction, then it has exclusive jurisdiction
until another court determines that no party remains in the previous state.
Those bright line tests create a jurisdictional scheme that differs
140. Id. at 218.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing In Re T.J.D.W., 642 S.E.2d 471, 473 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007); Button v. Waite, 208
S.W.3d 366, 370-72 (Tenn. 2006); Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
143. The case law in other jurisdictions supports this conclusion. See Nurie, supra note 136, at
500–01 (citing In Re Lewin, 149 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004); State of N.M., ex rel.
CYFD v. Donna J., 129 P.3d 167, 171 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
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significantly from the less certain144 cross-border jurisdiction in European
Union and international law’s habitual residence standard.
III. FROM EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION TO FAMILY
LAW JURISDICTION UNDER BRUSSEL’S IIBIS
European Union law determines jurisdiction for custody cases between
European Union Member States – a legal reality that has existed for only
a decade.145 Simply stated, Member State courts in the child’s habitual
residence have jurisdiction. However, the uncertainty of that term in EC
Regulation 2201/2002,146 colloquially known as Brussels IIbis (“BIIbis”),
gives Member State courts relatively broad discretion. In practice, the
habitual residence standard in BIIbis creates legal uncertainty, despite
European Union efforts to harmonize family law.147
Those efforts have gradually increased but still unsettle some European
Union citizens.148 After all, the European Union exists to facilitate the
internal market; how does family law serve that purpose?149 European
Union family law now resides comfortably within European Union
legislative competence, related to free movement of persons and the area
of freedom, security, and justice.150 While a review of European Union
law rests outside of the scope of this article, this Section reviews the
events that led to BIIbis.151 This Section also reveals habitual residence’s
uncertainty in parental responsibility cases by analyzing BIIbis cases in
the European Union’s Court of Justice and the United Kingdom.

144. William Duncan, Action in Support of the Hague Child Abduction Convention: A View
from the Permanent Bureau, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 103, 105 (2000).
145. See Brussels II infra note 171.
146. Council Regulation 2201/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1 (“BIIbis”).
147. See e.g., Andrew Dickinson, European Private International Law: Embracing New
Horizons or Mourning the Past, 1 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 197 (2005); Kirsty Barnes, The Role of the
European Union in the Harmonization of Private International Law: A Theoretical Perspective, 5
Cambridge Student L. R. 124 (2009). See generally, PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICATION AND
HARMONIZATION OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE, (Katharina Boele-Woelki ed., 2003).
148. Lord Scott of Foscote questioned, regarding EU initiatives regarding mutual recognition in
civil matters, “what has it necessarily got to do with the European Union?” House of Lords,
European Union Committee, 10th Report of Session 2004-2005, The Hague Programme: a five-year
agenda for EU justice and home affairs, report on the examination of witness Baroness Ashton of
Upholland, Q71; see also Vesna Lazic, “Recent Developments in Harmonizing ‘European Private
International Law’ in Family Matters” 10 Eur. J. L. Reform 75, 76 (2008).
149. Johan Meeusen, What Has it Got to Do Necessarily with the European Union:
International Family Law and European (Economic) Integration, 9 CAMBRIDGE Y. B. EUR. LEGAL
STUD. 329 (2006-2007).
150. Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), Article 81(3).
151. Dickinson 209 – 217 supra note 147; Eleanor Cashin Ritaine, Harmonising European
Private International Law: A Replay of Hannibal’s Crossing of the Alps?,” 34 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO.
419 (2006).
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A.

FROM ECONOMIC INTEGRATION TO FAMILY LAW JURISDICTION:
PAST TO PRESENT

1.

A CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL
MATTERS

Today’s European Union family law is rooted in private international law
conventions, when the European Union initially waded into this legal
area five decades ago with the Brussels I Convention on jurisdiction and
recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters.152 This
allowed the European Economic Community (“the Community”) to
simplify “the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and
enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals.”153
However, the only family law matter that Brussels I covered was
maintenance.154 Parental responsibility cases enjoyed no streamlining.155
For those matters, Member States could only negotiate on their own to
simplify recognition and enforcement of foreign custody orders.156
Nonetheless, Brussels I provided the bedrock for today’s European
Union jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement principles in divorce
and custody matters.157
For over two decades following Brussels I, the Community avoided
family law.158 Forces outside of the Community, however, developed
international family law.
Two multilateral conventions in 1980 addressed international child
abduction. The Council of Europe produced the European Convention
on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of
Children and Restoration of Custody of Children159 and the Hague
152. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, O.J. L299/32 (“Brussels I”); See Dickinson, supra note 147, at 200–06.
153. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(“EEC Treaty”), art. 220.
154. See Brussels I supra note 152.
155. The drafters excluded divorce because:
[t]he most serious difficulty with regard to status and legal capacity is obviously that of divorce, a
problem which is complicated by the extreme divergences between the various systems of law.
Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil matters, [1968]
OJ.. C59/10 (“Jenard Report”); see also Explanatory Report on the Convention, drawn up on the
basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters, [1998] O.J. C221/29 (“Borras Report”).
156. EEC Treaty, supra note 153 at Article 220.
157. NIGEL LOWE, INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF CHILDREN 13 (Jordan: Bristol, England,
2003).
158. The Community passed no family law treaties or laws between Brussels I and Brussels II.
159. 20 May 1980, E.T.S. 105.
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Conference on Private International Law completed the related Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.160 In
short, these conventions protected parental responsibility jurisdiction in
the child’s habitual residence. If someone wrongfully removed a child
from its habitual residence to another signatory country, a custodial
parent could petition a court to immediately order the child’s return to
the previous habitual residence.161
These treaties promoted harmonization and the role of habitual residence
in international family law. Still, the Community could not force
Member States to sign these conventions or legislate regarding family
law jurisdiction. European heads of state pushed for increased
Community power, which resulted in the 1986 Single European Act.162
Though this ensured “an area without frontiers [and] the free movement
of goods, persons, services and capital” in the internal market,163 it did
not yet confer Community competence in family law.
In 1992, after 35 years of free movement, the Community gained
competence to regulate family law. The Treaty on European Union164
broadened Community competence165 by requiring “judicial cooperation
in civil matters.”166 This mandated communication and cooperation
between Member States and the Council of Ministers (“the Council”) to
achieve that goal.
Based on those communications, the Council could “draw up [and
recommend conventions] to the Member States for adoption in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”167 In turn,
Member States communicated their family law needs to the Council,
demanding in requests and questionnaires recognition and enforcement
of family court orders.168 In October 1993, the European Group on
Private International Law proposed a convention on the recognition of
judgments in family matters.169 Member States voiced support, and the

160. 25 October 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 49 (“Abduction Convention”).
161. Id.
162. Paul Craig and Grainine De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials 12 (Oxford
University Press, 2008).
163. Treaty on European Union, [1992] O.J. C 224/1, 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (“TEU”),
Article 3(c).
164. Id.
165. Lowe, supra note 157 at 9.
166. TEU supra note 163 at Article K.1 (6). See also Dickinson, supra note 147, at 207.
167. Id.
168. Lowe, supra note 157 at 12. See also Borras Report, supra note 155 at para 7.
169. Borras Report, supra note 155 at para 8.
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European Council instructed the Council to draft a convention on family
law.170
The Council completed a draft on which the European Parliament
delivered its opinion.171 The Council approved Brussels II on May 28,
1998, which all Member States signed,172 and Brussels II had direct effect
in national courts.173
This treaty applied to jurisdiction, enforcement, and recognition. It
differentiated between jurisdiction for divorces and parental
responsibility cases. For divorce, a wide range of jurisdictional
determinants existed, but fewer grounds existed for parental
responsibility jurisdiction. 174
In parental responsibility cases, courts had priority jurisdiction in the
Member State of the child’s habitual residence.175 A court in a Member
State other than the child’s habitual residence had jurisdiction on other
grounds only in specific circumstances.176
In child abduction cases, courts had to “exercise their jurisdiction in
conformity with the [Abduction Convention],”177 which also required

170. Id.
171. Judgments in Matrimonial Matters [1998] O.J. C152/69. The Council considered the
opinion—but largely ignored the EP’s suggestions. Cf. id with Council Act of 28 May 1998 drawing
up, on basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, the Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters, [1998] O.J. C221/1 (“Brussels
II”).
172. Borras Report, supra note 155 at para 11.
173. See Van Gend En Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Belastingen (Case 26/62) [1963]
ECR 1.
174. For matrimonial proceedings, Brussels II, Art. 2 provided a relatively broad determination
of jurisdiction where:
— the spouses are habitually resident, or
— the spouses were last habitually resident, in so far as one of them still resides there, or
— the respondent is habitually resident, or
— in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses is habitually resident, or
— the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year
immediately before the application was made, or
— the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months
immediately before the application was made and is either a national of the Member State
in question or is ‘domiciled’ there
Also, courts of a State had jurisdiction when the spouses were both nationals of that State or both
domiciled there.
175. Brussels II, supra note 171 at Articles 3 (1) & (2).
176. See Id at Articles 8 – 11.
177. Id at Article 4; Borras Report, supra note 155 at para 41.
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habitual residence determinations.178 Accordingly, habitual residence
began as the most important jurisdictional factor under Brussels II.179
In several ways, however, Brussels II was a cautious exercise of
legislative competence in family law. Most noticeably, Brussels II only
dealt with parental responsibility in matrimonial proceedings and only
applied to children of both married parents.180 Procedurally, the treaty
format encumbered future legislative action.181 Thus, while Brussels II
was a significant move in European Union family law, its shortcomings
were instantly apparent.
2.

BRUSSELS II BECOMES REGULATION 1347/2000

Even before Brussels II’s completion, a major shift in the Community
would soon make the family law convention format obsolete. The 1997
Treaty of Amsterdam changed the structure and substance of the
European Union Treaties and bolstered the Community institutions’
legislative powers.182 EC Treaty Article 2 expanded European Union
power in the area of “freedom, security, and justice,” which facilitated
free movement of persons.183
To ensure freedom of movement, the EC Treaty required the Council to
adopt “measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters,”
including jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement in civil matters.184
To achieve this end, the Council had to “act unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission . . . after consulting the European Parliament.”185
Under these mandates, the Commission began the legislative process to
turn Brussels II into a Council Regulation.186 On May 29, 2000, the
178. See Abduction Convention, supra note 160 at Article 3.
179. Meeusen, supra note 149 at 329.
180. Brussels II, supra note 171 (applying only to “civil proceedings relating to parental
responsibility for the children of both spouses on the occasion of matrimonial proceedings.”); Borras
Report, supra note 155 at para 20, (“civil proceedings” encompassed judicial and non-judicial
proceedings, such as administrative proceedings such as those in Denmark and Finland but not
religious proceedings.
181. Nigel Lowe, “The Growing Influence of the European Union in International Family
Law,” 56 Current Legal Problems 439, 470 (2003).
182. Craig and De Burca, supra note 162at 21 – 22.
183. M. Bogdan, “The EC Treaty and the Use of Nationality and Habitual Residence as
Connecting Factors in International Family Law,” in J. Meeusen (ed.) International Family Law for
the European Union (Oxford: Intersentia, 2007) 303.
184. Treaty Establishing the European Community, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 Article 62, 65 (“EC
Treaty”).
185. Id at Art. 67(1).
186. See, Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee [1999] O.J. C386/23; [2000] O.J.
C189/91; [2000] O.J. C275/13E.
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Council adopted Council Regulation 1347/2000, which entered into force
with direct effect on 1 March 2000.187 This Regulation, Brussels II
Regulation (“BIIR”), exhibited largely formal differences from Brussels
II, while sharing most of its substance as family law became the subject
of European Union legislation.
It should be recognized, however, that the European Union had protected
family life before BIIR. For example, families enjoyed protection under
Regulation 1612/68,188 which granted free movement to families of
migrating workers.189 Further, the Court of Justice of the European
Union (“CJ”) addressed family-related matters concerning free
However,
movement in Reed,190 Konstantinidis,191 and Dafeki.192
compared to these previous efforts, BIIR signaled expanded legislative
competence in family law to promote free movement of persons.193
Despite this apparent competence, BIIR’s substance retained most of
Brussels II’s inadequacies. Thus, BIIR remained in effect for only five
years.194 In fact, even before its adoption, the Community and Member
States prodded continued European Union family law progress.
B.

TODAY’S JURISDICTION UNDER BRUSSELS IIBIS

Before BIIR’s adoption, the European Council catalyzed further family
law legislation. European heads of state in the Tampere European
Council placed the “European judicial area” at the “very top of the
political agenda,” expressing a need to make parental access rights
enforceable in Member States.195 Seizing on this momentum in 1999,
France presented an initiative to the Commission to enforce parental
access rights in all Member States.196 The Commission responded, as it
187. Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments
in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children of both spouses, [2000]
O.J. L160/19 (“BIIR”).
188. Council Regulation (EEC) on freedom of movement of workers within the Community,
[1968] O.J. L 257/2 (now expanded under Council Directive (EC) 2004/38/EC, [2004] O.J. L
229/35).
189. See Meeusen, supra note 149 at 330.
190. Netherlands v. Reed, Case 59/85, [1986] ECR 1283 (extending legal residence for
unmarried companions of workers who were nationals of another Member State).
191. Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig-Standesamt, Case C-168/91, [1993] ECR I-1191
(involving family name).
192. Dafeki v. Landesversicherungsanstalt, Case C-336/94, [1997] ECR I-6761 (involving
recognition of status documents from other Member States).
193. See Meeusen, supra note 149 at 334 – 339.
194. Clare McGynn, Families and the European Union 109 – 110 (Cambridge University Press
2006).
195. Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15 October 1999, para 5, point 33.
196. [2000] O.J.C234/07.
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was obliged to make proposals on Member State initiatives in crossborder civil matters.197 In turn, the Commission proposed repealing and
replacing BIIR.
That proposal contained several important changes. Most notably, the
Commission included all parental responsibility matters to “ensure
equality for all children.”198 This proposal made its way through the
legislative process.199 On November 27, 2003, the Council adopted
BIIbis, which enjoyed direct effect in Member States on March, 1
2005.200 Habitual residence maintains its primary jurisdictional position,
with some provisions for exceptional jurisdiction.201
Courts that have initial jurisdiction enjoy a relatively tiny measure of
continuing jurisdiction. If a child moves lawfully to another Member
State, courts in the previous habitual residence have continuing
jurisdiction only over access rights for three months after the move, and
only if one parent still resides in the former habitual residence.202 The
parent in the previous habitual residence can waive continuing
jurisdiction by appearing in a custody action in the new habitual
residence without contesting jurisdiction.203
This continuing access right jurisdiction is objective and time-bound, but
courts could have conflicting jurisdiction if a child acquires a new
habitual residence.204 Nonetheless, this three-month provision briefly
protects legally left-behind parents in the interim period between losing a
former habitual residence and gaining a new one. This time period
provides an objective measure of jurisdiction during the time when a
child potentially has no habitual residence.
197. EC Treaty, supra note 184 Article 67(1).
198. Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility, [2002]
O.J. C203/155E at Preamble 5, Preamble 9.
199. Id; Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council
Regulation concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility,’ [2003] O.J. C61/76; European
Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matter and in matter of parental responsibility, [2004] O.J.
C25/171 E..
200. See BIIbis, supra note 146.
201. See Ruth Lamont, “Habitual Residence and Brussels IIbis: Developing Concepts for
European Private International Family Law,” 3 J. Priv. Int’l L. 261 (2007) (citing Thorpe, LJ, “The
Work of the Head of International Family Law,” http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/
library.asp?i=1981, accessed March 9, 2010.)
202. OJEC (2003) L338 1 at Art. 9(1).
203. Id. at Art. 9(2)
204. P. McEleavy, “Current Developments: Private International Law,” 53 Int’l & Comp. L.Q.
504 (2004).
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Other situations arise when children have no habitual residence. In these
relatively rare situations, presence determines jurisdiction.205 When no
court has jurisdiction, the national laws of the Member State court seized
with the action determine jurisdiction.206 Even if a court has jurisdiction,
it may exceptionally request the court of another Member State with
which the child has a close connection to take the case in the best
interests of the child.207
Child abduction cases preserve jurisdiction in the habitual residence at
the time of the wrongful removal for one year, which represents a
departure from the general habitual residence standard. For one year,
courts in the previous habitual residence retain jurisdiction, unless all
parties with parental responsibility acquiesce to jurisdiction in the new
habitual residence.208 After one year, a court in the new habitual
residence may take jurisdiction once the wrongfully removed child has
settled in the new environment, if one of four additional conditions
exists.209
Even after a court determines habitual residence and exercises
jurisdiction, another court may have the power to issue provisional
orders.210 The CJ recently handed down a decision dealing with a
provisional order, holding that the case must be urgent, the order must be
temporary, and it must relate to persons or property in the state.211 This
decision limits the availability of provisional orders. Thus, habitual
residence remains the primary jurisdictional factor.
C.

HABITUAL RESIDENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION COURTS

Brussels IIbis does not define habitual residence. This regrettable
omission leaves habitual residence as a “question of fact to be
appreciated by the judge in each case.”212 Habitual residence is a term
with wide application in private international law that generally
205. Brussels IIbis Art. 13.
206. Brussels IIbis Art. 14.
207. Id at Art. 5(3) (defining close connection as a subsequent habitual residence, former
habitual residence, child’s nationality, habitual residence of a custodial parent, or a place where the
child have property subject to a court order); Id at Art. 15.
208. Id at Art. 10 (a). This provision matches that in Article 12 of the Abduction Convention.
209. Id at Art. 10(b) describes these four conditions.
210. BIIbis, Art. 20 provides that: In urgent cases, the provisions of this regulation shall not
prevent the courts of a Member State from taking such provisional, including protective, measures in
respect of the person or assets in that State as may be available under the laws of that Member State,
even if, under this Regulation, the court of another Member State has jurisdiction as to the substance
of the matter.
211. Deti ek v Maurizio Sgueglia, C-403/09 PPU (2009)
212. Peter Stone, EU Private International Law 400 (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK 2006);
COM [2002] 22 final, 3 May 2002, at p. 9.
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determines jurisdiction.213 The term lacks a legal definition,214 instead
representing a factual determination that is “simple to apply and flexible,
changing as the circumstances of an individual, or family, change over
time.”215 Thus, a court must consider the facts of each individual case to
determine habitual residence – a vague standard that required the CJ’s
attention.216
1.

HABITUAL RESIDENCE IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION

The CJ has addressed that fact-based test.217 The case A involved a
parental responsibility dispute between a mother and a Finnish public
child welfare agency. 218 Three children lived with their mother and
stepfather in Sweden since 2001.219 In 2005, the family traveled to
Finland to stay for the summer. In October, they applied for public
housing in Finland.220 In November, a local welfare agency removed the
children to a childcare unit.221 The mother unsuccessfully challenged this
action in a Finnish court.222 On appeal, the Supreme Administrative
Court of Finland submitted four questions to the European Court.223
In the central question, the Finnish court asked how to determine the
peripatetic children’s habitual residence.224 Advocate General Kokott225
proposed a precise BIIbis habitual residence definition in the best
interests of children.226 Distinguishing between presence and habitual
213. Peter Stone, The Concept of Habitual Residence in Private International Law, 44 INT’1 &
COMP. L.Q. 771 (1995); Lamont, see supra note 201 at 263.
214. Lowe, supra note 157 at 60.
215. Lamont, supra note 157 at 263. Professor Lowe identified four habitual residence tests.
The (1) dependency test is similar to domicile as it relates solely to the parent’s habitual residence.
The (2) parental rights test ties the child’s habitual residence to that of the custodial parent. Not
surprisingly, courts have rejected these two tests as too simplistic and legalistic for efficient
application. The (3) child-centered test considers the “nature and quality of the child’s residence in a
particular country,” but fails to exclude parental intent in practice. The (4) fact-based test has largely
prevailed, which considers all of the facts in a given case to determine the child’s habitual residence.
Lowe supra note 157 at 60 – 62.
216. Stone, supra note 212 at 400 and 412.
217. Id at 63; see also Rhona Shuz “Habitual residence of children under the Hague Child
Abduction Convention – Theory and practice,” CFLQ 1 (2001).
218. A, Case C-523/07, [2009] O.J. C 141/14.
219. A, Case C-523/07, Advocate General Opinion at para 6 (“AG opinion”).
220. Id.
221. Id at para 7.
222. Id at para 8.
223. The CJ has jurisdiction over questions referred by national courts that concern the
interpretation of the European Union’s legislative acts under TEU, supra note 163 at Art. 267.
224. AG Opinion, supra note 219 at para 9.
225. Advocate General opinions provide more details regarding the facts, arguments, and law
involved in CJ cases.
226. Id at paras 13 – 18.
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residence, Kokott referenced private international law to interpret the
issue.227
Following the CJ’s judgment in Rinau,228 Kokott used the Abduction
Convention’s guiding principles to determine habitual residence “by
reference to all the relevant circumstances . . . distinguished from the
legalistic concept of domicile.”229
In embracing that definition, Kokott rejected the Commission’s
suggestion that habitual residence contemplates parental intent.230
Kokott, however, reasoned that while intent had been useful in
determining habitual residence for divorces under Brussels II,231 intent
was less important in parental responsibility cases. When determining a
child’s habitual residence, children often lack intent, and parents’
intentions often conflict.232
Further, Kokott rejected habitual residence’s definition in social law.
The CJ included intent in determining habitual residence in Swaddling, a
social security benefits case,233 and national courts had applied the
Swaddling definition for BIIbis cases.234 The Advocate General, and the
CJ, nonetheless shifted from intent to establish an autonomous, factbased habitual residence definition for parental responsibility cases by
examining two factors: (1) the “duration and regularity of residence” and
(2) the “child’s familial and social integration.”235
First dealing with duration and regularity of residence, the Advocate
General rejected any strict time limit.236 Instead, the Advocate General
found that the amount of time to establish habitual residence depended
on children’s ages and individual familial and social circumstances.237
While habitual residence tolerates interruptions, children lose a previous
227. Id at paras 21 – 25.
228. Case C – 195/08 PPL, [2008] O.J. C223/19.
229. AG Opinion supra note 219 at paras 30 - 31.
230. Id at para 33(“‘the place of habitual residence is that in which the [person] concerned has
established, with the intention that it should be of a lasting character, the permanent or habitual
centre of his interests. For the purposes of determining habitual residence, all the factual
circumstances which constitute such residence and, in particular, the actual residence of the [person]
concerned must be taken into account.’”) (citing Borras Report).
231. AG Opinion, supra note 219 at para 31.
232. AG Opinion at paras 31, 36.
233. Swaddling v. Social Security Commissioner, [1997] Case C-90/97 at para 29.
234. See e.g. Marinos v. Marinos, [2007] EWHC 2047 (UK) at para 24; M.(P.) v. Devins,
[2007] IEHC 380 (Ireland); see also Lamont, supra note 201 at 262 (suggesting intent as a habitual
residence determination factor).
235. AG Opinion, supra note 219 at paras 38, 40.
236. Id at para 41.
237. Id.
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habitual residence when “a return to the original place of residence is not
foreseeable.”238
Further, Kokott noted that habitual residence can shift quickly, as
evidenced by BIIbis’ three-month period of continuing jurisdiction for
access rights.239 Parental intent can play a role in assessing the regularity
of the residence but only when intent manifests toward the child’s
integration by, for example, enrolling the child in school, leasing or
purchasing property, or changing addresses.240 Kokott thus defined the
stay’s duration and regularity.
Second, Kokott examined factors surrounding a child’s familial and
social integration. These factors can vary with the child’s age, but
contact with relatives, “school, friends, leisure activities and, above all,
command of language are important.”241 Considering these factors,
courts must determine whether a habitual residence exists.
The CJ largely adopted Kokott’s opinion regarding the need for uniform
and autonomous interpretation, a unique habitual residence definition in
parental responsibility cases, and habitual residence’s relevant factors.242
Instead of examining intent, the CJ held that habitual residence:
corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of
integration by the child in a social and family environment. To
that end, in particular the duration, regularity, conditions and
reasons for the stay on the territory of a Member State and the
family’s move to that State, the child’s nationality, the place and
conditions of attendance at school, linguistic knowledge and the
family and social relationships of the child in that State must be
taken into consideration. It is for the national court to establish
the habitual residence of the child, taking account of all the
circumstances specific to each individual case.243
Thus, the CJ named roughly eight factors to consider when determining
habitual residence: (1) duration, (2) regularity, (3) conditions, (4) reasons
for the child’s presence, (5) school attendance, (6) linguistic knowledge,
238. Id.
239. Id at para 42 (providing national courts continuing jurisdiction over access rights after legal
removals in BIIbis Article 9).
240. Id at para 44.
241. Id at para 48.
242. A, Case C – 523/07, [2009] O.J. C 141/14 at para 34 – 44 (“A”).
243. Id at para 38 (considering intent perhaps only on this issue of whether the child’s presence
was temporary);Id at para 44.
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(7) family relationships, and (8) social relationships. Without reference
to parental intent, the CJ returned the case to the Finnish court.244
When the case returned to Finland, the Finnish Court found “more
factors supporting Finland rather than Sweden as the children’s country
of residence.”245 Thus, despite four previous years in Sweden, the
Finnish Court found habitual residence in Finland based on the CJ’s
factors.
These eight factors could theoretically bring a measure of uniformity to
habitual residence determinations among Member State courts.
However, such a list of factors makes certainty a remote possibility. The
CJ failed to offer concrete guidelines for duration and regularity. Simply
considering conditions and reasons for presence does not provide much
direction because the CJ did not elucidate how these factors weighed in
the determination.
The last four factors are somewhat more objective, but they do not
provide readily objective answers. School attendance is probably a good
measure of a child’s integration, but the courts did not mention whether
the children in A attended school in Finland. Linguistic knowledge is
objective, but some European Union countries share languages and
children may learn both parents’ languages. Finally, family and social
relationships may exist in several Member States. Thus, even in courts
that follow these factors, European Union parents still face uncertainty.
Worse still, some courts have already chosen a much broader reading of
this CJ decision.
2.

HABITUAL RESIDENCE AGAIN IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE

Most recently, the CJ heard a case through urgent preliminary
procedure246 that addressed habitual residence and loosely applied A’s
test. The case Mercredi involved a mother who removed her infant child
from England to Réunion Island, a French territory.247 Five days after the
244. Id at para 44.
245. Korkein hallinto-oikeus, Yearbook No. KHO:2009:68, File No. 1681, Register No.
3356/06, 3357/06, 3358/06 (30 June 2009) (summary and full-text available at
http://www.juradmin.eu/en/jurisprudence/jurifast/jurifast_en.php?PHPSESSID=lnsc57go5od6db04c
8jdf2eep0&page=detail&id=407).
246. See, Council Decision of 20 December 2007 amending the Protocol on the Statute of the
Court of Justice and amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice adopted by the
Court on 15 January 2008 (OJEU 2008 L 24, p. 39). See also, Court of Justice of the European
Union, Information for the Press No. 12/08, “A New Procedure in the Area of Freedom, Security,
and Justice: The Urgent Preliminary Ruling Procedure” (March 3, 2008).
247. Case C-497/10 PPU, Mercredi (Court of First Instance 22 December 2010).
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removal, the father initiated custody proceedings in the English courts.248
An English court asked the European Court of Justice to clarify habitual
residence. The CJ noted habitual residence’s supposed “independent and
uniform interpretation throughout the European Union”249 as “the place
which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and
family environment … taking account of all the circumstances of fact
specific to each individual case.”250 The CJ then handpicked from A’s
criteria, holding that “particular mention should be made of the
conditions and reasons for the child’s stay on the territory of a Member
State, and the child’s nationality.”251 In addition, “other factors must also
make it clear that that presence is not in any way temporary or
intermittent.”252
Then, the CJ unwisely magnified A’s mention of parental intent,
holding: that the intention of the person with parental
responsibility to settle permanently with the child in another
Member State, manifested by certain tangible steps such as the
purchase or rental of accommodation in the host Member State,
may constitute an indicator of the transfer of the habitual
residence.253
The CJ further divorced the habitual residence definition from duration
by stating that “duration of a stay can serve only as an indicator in the
assessment of the permanence of the residence.”254 The court added that
the child’s young age in this case was of particular importance.255 Thus,
the CJ reframed the test in A as heavily relying on parental intent and the
child’s age.
With those factors, the CJ seemingly endorsed that the mother’s intent to
change the infant’s habitual residence shifted the habitual residence –
after five days. The CJ posited that the “the languages known to the
mother,” her “geographic and family origins and the family and social
connections which the mother and child [had] with [the] Member State”
were particularly important, while downplaying the brief duration.256
Apparently, Mercredi shifts A’s test toward intent, giving courts leeway
to examine facts and drastically shortening the time – in this case
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id at para. 25.
Id at para. 45.
Id at para. 47 (citing A at para 44).
Id at para. 48.
Id at para. 49.
Id at para. 50.
Id at para. 51.
Id at para. 52.
Id at paras 55 – 56.
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potentially five days – to establish habitual residence for infants. This
shift only weakens habitual residence’s certainty but follows similar
previous applications in United Kingdom courts.257
Fortunately, when the case returned to the English High Court of Justice
Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Thorpe did not find such a rapid change of
habitual residence.258 Albeit dicta, in Mercredi v. Chaffe, Lord Justice
Thorpe stated that the child’s “English habitual residence had not been
abandoned” in the five to seven days after the child’s removal.259
Nonetheless, the CJ’s decision in Mercredi leaves Member State courts
the option to allow swift changes in infants’ habitual residence based on
intent.
3.

HABITUAL RESIDENCE IN TWO POST-A UNITED KINGDOM CASES

Previously, United Kingdom courts already included parental intent in
habitual residence. A loose focus on “all the circumstances specific to
each individual case”260 subverts uniform interpretation among national
courts. The following two United Kingdom cases show habitual
residence’s slipperiness.
First, in S(A Child), a court did not effectively apply the CJ’s decision in
A.261 A Belgian father and an Australian mother had a daughter in
December 2005 in Australia. The child spent most of her life in a small
Belgian village with her parents and grandmother.262 In February 2007,
the father signed a three-year lease in that Belgian village.263
In March 2007, the father took a three-month job in Belfast.264 In April,
the mother and child followed, staying in an apartment that his employer
provided there.265 In May 2007, the mother and child returned to
Belgium.266 The father took a two-year job in London, where for six
weeks he stayed with a friend during the week and returned to Belgium
on the weekends.267

257. See, e.g., In Re J. infra note 392.
258. Mercredi v. Chaffe, [2011] EWCA 272 (High Court of Justice Court of Appeal 2011)
(England).
259. Id at paras 52, 97.
260. A supra note 242 at para 37.
261. S(A Child), [2009] EWCA Civ 1021 (UK).
262. Id at para 4.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol17/iss1/5

34

Heine: Home State, Cross-Border Custody

2011]

HOME STATE, CROSS-BORDER CUSTODY

43

Then, the father’s friend offered his England home for the family’s use.268
In August 2007, the family moved in but left most of their possessions in
Belgium.269 The daughter spent two weeks with her grandmother in
Belgium in September.270 Unfortunately, the opportunity to use free
housing fell through by the end of September 2007.271
At this time, the marriage fell apart.272 The mother planned to take the
child to Australia, but the father snatched the child to Belgium on
September 28.273 The mother took her case to an English court that
decided the child’s habitual residence had been England.274
Affirming, the appellate judge repeatedly emphasized the indeterminate
three to nine months that the family planned at the borrowed English
home, despite the primary Belgian home.275 The judge opined that the
“constancy of that primary home [did] not prevent the acquisition of
habitual residence in the work country if the other elements within the
defined principles of acquisition [were] satisfied.”276 The court noted the
father’s “very substantial” English connection through employment, tax
contributions, and work permits.277 Based on these connections and
intent, the child acquired English habitual residence in six interrupted
weeks.278
This English court’s analysis is troubling. Those connections and intent
had little to do with the child’s integration. Thus, the decision ignores
the A court’s analysis instead relying heavily on the trial court’s
balancing, a trial that occurred before A defined habitual residence.
Under that test’s eight factors cited above, the child’s habitual residence
had not shifted. The duration was brief – less than two months.279 The
stay lacked regularity, as the child spent two weeks with her grandmother
in Belgium during her brief time in England.280 The conditions were
temporary. The child was present simply to share a rent-free home with
both parents.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id at para 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at para 6.
Id.
Id at para 13.
Id at paras 5, 13, 14.
Id at para 13.
Id at para 13.
Id at para 15.
Id at para. 6.
Id at para. 5.
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Further, the court made no reference to school attendance or linguistic
knowledge, two factors under A.281 Finally, the child had limited family
and social relationships in England. Her parents lived temporarily in
England, and her grandmother, with whom she spent a quarter of her
residence in England, was in Belgium. Therefore, this analysis strays
from A’s test.
In a second United Kingdom appellate case,282 a mother lawfully took her
children from Spain to Wales to live with their grandparents and to
attend school for a year.283 After that year, they returned to Spain and
enrolled in school.284 About two months later, the mother unlawfully
removed the children back to Wales.285 A Welsh trial court ordered their
return to Spain.286
On appeal, the mother argued that the first move established Wales as the
children’s habitual residence.287 Lord Justice Ward noted that “acquiring
habitual . . . residence . . . permits a stay of comparatively short time [,
whereas] domicile . . . requires an intention to remain . . .
indefinitely.”288 Without setting time limit, habitual residence “depends
‘more upon the evidence of matters susceptible of objective proof than
upon evidence as to state of mind.’”289 However, the court recalled that
“[h]abitual residence of young children of married parents all living
together as a family is the same as the habitual residence of the parents
themselves and neither parent can change it without the express or tacit
consent of the other or an order of the court.”290
Applying this definition, the children’s “ordered way of life was
Spanish”:
Their education had been undertaken there and with the mother's
collaboration it was arranged that it should continue in Spain
upon their return. Their schooling in Wales was for a temporary
period and for the limited purpose of improving their English.
281. Id; A supra note 242 at para. 44.
282. P-J (Children), [2009] 2 FLR 1051 (UK). http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.
aspx?i=ed37069
283. Id at para 3.
284. Id at para 4.
285. Id at para 8.
286. Id at para 21.
287. Id at para 23.
288. Id at para 26.
289. Id (citing Reg. v Barnet London Borough Council, ex parte Nilish Shah [1983] 2 A.C. 309
(UK)).
290. Id at para 26.
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Their home was in Spain, not with their grandparents in Wales.
The visit to Wales was a convenient respite to meet the dual
objectives of increasing their language skills and refurbishing the
Spanish home. The mother actively participated in the planning
of the work even whilst she was in Wales. The essential dental
work was carried out in Spain. . . . [The f]amily life was centred
[sic] on Spain, which is simply another way of saying Spain was
the regular order of their life.291
The court thus concluded that the habitual residence was Spain.
That conclusion was correct. However, the court’s analysis reveals two
problems. First, the court only loosely applied the factors from A. Under
A, the same conclusion follows because the mother could not likely show
that the children’s “presence [was] not in any way temporary.”292
Instead, the court examined precedent in tax law cases, thereby obscuring
habitual residence’s autonomous meaning in parental responsibility
cases. While the factors may be similar, the court misguidedly
referenced the wrong context for parental responsibility cases.
Second, the case exposes an additional source of uncertainty in BIIbis:
temporary absence.
Temporary absence complicates these
determinations by relying on parental intent. As in this case, parents
often contest whether or not an absence was temporary. Courts strain to
discover parental intent. Thus, the temporary absence issue increases
uncertainty in BIIbis cases.
Moreover, parental intent may have little to do with a child’s integration.
Intentions aside, children may integrate during extended stays, a reality
that Brussels IIbis recognizes.293 In fact, these children might have
integrated in Wales under a narrow reading of the factors in A.
After all, the children were present in Wales regularly and for a
substantial duration. They stayed with their grandparents for a year.
They acquired language skills and attended school, which established
two explicit factors in A. They developed relationships with family and
classmates. These factors combine to at least suggest a Welsh habitual
residence. The two United Kingdom cases above demonstrate a broad
habitual residence test’s weaknesses. Even after A, parents still face
great uncertainty in European Union Member State’s national courts.
291.
292.
293.

Id at para 34.
A supra note 242 at para 38.
See BIIbis, Articles 9 & 10.
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CONCLUSIONS REGARDING BIIBIS

As this section demonstrates, BIIbis marks a significant milestone in
European Union family law. This development supplies a necessary
component for free movement of persons and a functioning area of
freedom, security, and justice. Habitual residence’s role in cross-border
jurisdiction seems cemented into place. However, the fact-based
standard leaves many families and courts with a malleable,
unpredictable, and often puzzling standard.
Hopefully, A will provide a level of uniformity to this enigmatic term.
While uniformity may be achievable, A leaves substantial uncertainty.
Further, perhaps only European Union citizens will reap the minimal
benefits of the uniformity from A. As seen below, habitual residence
under international family law treaties remains out of reach of the CJ –
fractured and uncertain.
IV. HABITUAL RESIDENCE UNDER THE HAGUE
CONVENTIONS
A.

THE 1996 HAGUE CHILD PROTECTION CONVENTION

The Brussels II Convention’s crib mate was the wider-reaching 1996
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition,
Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and
Measures for the Protection of Children (“1996 Convention”), which
entered into force on January 1, 2002. In addition to jurisdiction,
recognition and enforcement, this Convention’s name indicates its two
additional aims: applicable law and cooperation.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law (“Hague
Conference”) has met since 1893 as a venue for different legal traditions
to come together and facilitate cross-border civil and commercial
matters. Accordingly, the Hague Conference is the most appropriate
institution for negotiating international family law treaties, including the
1996 Convention.
With 19 Contracting Parties and 28 signatories so far, this multilateral
treaty will likely play a major role in future cross-border parental
responsibility cases.294 All European Union Member States have signed
the 1996 Convention,295 and the United States is taking steps toward
294. Hague Conference on Private International Law, “Status Table,” http://www.
hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=70.
295. Id.
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signing.296 The 1996 Convention will determine parental responsibility
jurisdiction between signatories.
The Hague Conference’s Special Commission drafted this treaty to
update its 1961 predecessor and conform to the 1993 United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child.297 The 1996 Convention broadly
defines parental responsibility as “parental authority, or any analogous
relationship of authority determining the rights, powers and
responsibilities of parents, guardians or other legal representatives in
relation to the person or the property of the child.”298
The key jurisdictional factor in these parental responsibility matters is
habitual residence.299 Other bases exist in relatively rare cases where no
habitual residence exists, a new habitual residence exists due to a
wrongful removal, a court declares forum non conveniens, or jurisdiction
in divorce proceedings exists under strict conditions.300 Additionally,
any protective orders in other States require cooperation with authorities
in the child’s habitual residence.301
The term habitual residence was not a newcomer to the Hague
Conference. The Hague Conference has used habitual residence to
determine jurisdiction in many areas of private international law.302
Considering its well-established usage, the drafters unanimously
approved primary jurisdiction in the child’s habitual residence,
maintaining identical language from the 1961 Convention that the
authorities in the state of the child’s habitual residence have
jurisdiction.303
The drafters considered adding a definition of habitual residence in the
Convention,304 but declined to do so based on the term’s use in other
Hague Conventions.305 This was an unfortunate omission because it
missed the opportunity to clear up the uncertainty that the term has in
international family law.

296. See http://www.state.gov/s/l/family/index.htm.
297. Explanatory Report on the 1996 Hague Convention (1998) (“LaGarde Report”) at para. 1.
298. See 1996 Convention at Art. 1 para. 2
299. See 1996 Convention at Id at Art. 5.
300. See Id at Arts. 6 – 9, 10:
301. Id at Arts. 11 & 12.
302. See P. Stone, “The Concept of Habitual Residence in Private International Law,” 29
Anglo-American L.R. 342 (2000).
303. Lagarde Report at ¶ 40.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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In an attempt to add some certainty, the United States delegation
suggested that the 1996 Convention define situations that would not
change a child’s habitual residence.306 The drafters did not include such
language, but negotiations indicated that temporary absences from a
Contracting State would not change the habitual residence.307
Unfortunately, this bare recognition offered no guidance as to how to
determine an absence’s temporariness. Thus, without a definition, courts
determine habitual residence based on each case’s facts.
This fact-based determination aligns with BIIbis – and not
coincidentally. Because the European Union modeled the Brussels II
Convention on the 1996 Convention, the offspring BIIbis largely shares
substantive traits regarding jurisdiction. However, BIIbis applies
between European Union Member States, whereas the 1996 Convention
applies between signatories.
Under the 1996 Convention, habitual residence is likewise a shifting
concept that carries jurisdiction as it changes when a child acquires a
new habitual residence. Accordingly, once a child acquires a new
habitual residence, no continuing jurisdiction exists for courts in the
previous habitual residence, even one seized of an action, except in
wrongful removal cases.308 Unlike in BIIbis, no continuing jurisdiction
exists for access right holders either.
Though delegates suggested exclusive, continuing jurisdiction for two
years after an order, the Conference rejected such a measure.309 Instead,
the drafters decided that a court’s physical proximity promoted the best
interests of the child. Thus, continuing jurisdiction does not exist under
the 1996 Convention, except for child abduction cases.
The 1996 Convention preserves jurisdiction in child abduction cases.
After abduction, the court in the previous habitual residence generally
keeps jurisdiction, but a court in the new habitual residence can exercise
jurisdiction if certain conditions exist.310 The 1996 Convention provides
an immediate return under conditions like the Hague Abduction
Convention, affecting the child’s return between 1996 Convention
signatories.311

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id.
Id.
See 1996 Convention at Art. 5(2).
Lagarde Report at ¶ 40.
1996 Convention, Art. 7 (1) – (2).
See 1996 Convention at Art. 50.
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For a return under either the 1996 Convention or the Abduction
convention, courts must determine the child’s habitual residence.
Without much 1996 Convention case law available, the Abduction
Convention’s extensive case law shows the uncertain habitual residence
definition that the 1996 Convention inherits.
B.

THE HAGUE ABDUCTION CONVENTION

The Hague Abduction Convention provides a practical solution for
wrongful removals: immediate returns. Thus, the Abduction Convention
protects a custodial parent by functionally preventing another parent
from removing the child from the habitual residence to establish
jurisdiction in a new country where that parent may enjoy a friendlier
forum.312
For an abduction to occur, someone must remove the child from its
habitual residence.313 Thus, for abduction cases, courts must always
determine the child’s habitual residence. As a result, cases under the
Abduction Convention provide a wealth of case law among its 81
contracting States’ national courts. A review of Abduction Convention
cases nicely frames the habitual residence definition in United States and
European Union national courts.
Many courts have addressed this issue, developing divergent definitions
for habitual residence.314 However, the United States Supreme Court has
not defined habitual residence for Abduction Convention cases despite a
three-way fracture in the federal circuit courts.315
1.

THREE STANDARDS FOR HABITUAL RESIDENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES

(a)

Parental Shared Intent

Of the three standards in the federal circuit courts, the least certain
habitual residence standard relies primarily on parental intent. In the
Mozes case, a mother took her children from Israel to California with the
312. Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report at 428 - 429.
313. Hague Abduction Convention, Art. 3.
314. For a searchable database on decisions by signatories’ courts of all levels under the Hague
Abduction Convention, see http://www.incadat.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=convtext.showDetail&
lng=1. See also R. Lamont, Habitual Residence and Brussels IIbis: Developing Concepts for
European Private International Law, 3 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 261, 262 (2007). Note, however, that this
author and others have noticed shortcomings in this database. See C. Bruch & M. Durkin, The
Hague’s Online Child Abduction Materials: A Trap for the Unwary, 44 FAM L. Q. 65, 70 (2010).
315. See infra.
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father’s permission to stay for fifteen months.316 After twelve months,
she filed for divorce in California.317 In seeking a return, the father
argued that the mother wrongfully retained the children in California
from their habitual residence in Israel.318
The appellate court sought a consistent definition of habitual residence
and a uniform interpretation to promote legal certainty319 based on the
Abduction Convention’s enabling legislation.320 Unfortunately, the court
focused on the elusive standard of parental intent.321 Though some courts
examine objective facts such as “whether a child is doing well in school,
has friends, and so on,”322 the court rejected such objective tests as
“superficial.”323
Instead, the court held that “in the absence of settled parental intent,
courts should be slow to infer from such contacts that an earlier habitual
residence has been abandoned.”324 Because the Abduction Convention
seeks to deter child abductions, the court set that high standard and
adopted a shared intent analysis. Here, the court likened the children’s
time in the United States to that of an exchange student, which did not
shift habitual residence.325
This analysis creates a paradigm wherein one custodial parent, by
claiming intent to remain, can unilaterally block a child from acquiring a
new habitual residence to maintain the previous habitual residence. As
seen in Section II, this reasoning lacks logic, inserts subjectivity, and
makes courts examine purported intentions rather than focus on the best
interests of children.

316. Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. (recognizing parents’ vital interest in “knowing under what circumstances a child's
habitual residence is likely to be altered, and [the] cold comfort to be told only that this is ‘a question
of fact to be decided by reference to all the circumstances of any particular case.’” (citing C v. S,
[1990] 2 All E.R. 961, 965).
320. Id. at 1071 (“[W]e are mindful that Congress has emphasized ‘the need for uniform
international interpretation of the Convention.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B)).
321. Id. at 1076.
322. Id. at 1079 (citing Y.D. v. J.B. (Droit de la famille — 2454), [1996] R.J.Q. 2509, 2523
(Quebec Ct. App.) (“L'approche axée sur la réalité que vivent les enfants permet d'éviter d'avoir à
sonder les reins et les coeurs des parents."); Shah, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 235-36 (“The legal advantage
of adopting the natural and ordinary meaning ... is that it results in the proof of ordinary residence ...
depending more on the evidence of matters susceptible of objective proof than on evidence as to
state of mind.”)).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1083.
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For example, in Holder v. Holder, this paradigm questionably preserved
two children’s United States habitual residence. 326 A husband, wife, and
their sons had lived in Texas, Japan, and California when the family
moved to a German military base for the husband’s four-year
assignment.327 Eight months later, the mother took the children back to
the United States.328 The father claimed that both parents intended a
four-year stay in Germany.329 The mother, however, claimed that she had
no intention to abandon a United States habitual residence.330
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held, in an admittedly close case, that the
parents lacked a shared intent to move permanently.331 “Despite the
factual focus of [the] inquiry, ultimately [the] conclusion rests on a legal
determination,” that relied on Mozes’ analysis and the parents’ settled
intent. 332 “With parental intent as the starting point,” the court found no
joint intention to abandon “the children's habitual residence and shift it to
Germany.”333
The court then rejected the children’s “acclimatization” in Germany
despite all of the family belongings in Germany, the older child’s eight
months in a German school, a planned four-year stay, and an absence of
United States residence.334 Therefore, the mother’s contention that she
did not intend to stay in Germany blocked the children’s habitual
residence there.
Again, the shared parental intent test creates troubling results.
Essentially, this test allowed a mother to change her mind, remove her
children, and leave the father tied to his German post. This lopsided
analysis may serve one parent’s best interests but not necessarily the
children’s best interests. It ignores acclimatization in favor of unilateral
whim and purported intent.
Further demonstrating this test’s
weaknesses, the Eleventh Circuit has reached concerning results in even
longer stays. For example, in the case of Ruiz v. Tenorio, the appellate
court held that a child who stayed 32 months in Mexico was still
habitually resident in the United States.335
In Tsarbopoulos v.
Tsarbopoulos, a District Court preserved a child’s habitual United States
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1012.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1013.
Id. at 1018 (“We acknowledge this is a close case.”).
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1018–19.
Id. at 1019.
Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004).
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residence after 27 months in Greece.336 Under this shared parental
consent test, one parent inevitably faces miserable odds. Courts should
abandon this illogical and uncertain test that ignores the best interests of
the child. Fortunately, not all courts rely on parental intent.
(b)

Child-Centered Analysis

The Sixth Circuit applies a child-centered analysis. In Friedrich v.
Friedrich, another case on a military base in Germany, an American
woman and a German man met, married, and in 1989 had a child in
Germany.337 In an intense argument in 1991, the father told the mother to
leave their apartment and placed all of her’s and the child’s belongings in
the hallway.338 Five days later, the mother took the young son to Ohio
without the father’s knowledge.339
The father petitioned for a Hague return.340 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
performed a child-centered analysis. It began by declining to determine
a United States habitual residence based on the child’s legal residence or
the mother’s intent to return to Ohio. Instead, the court looked back in
time to the facts in the child’s life.341 The court held that a child’s
“habitual residence can be ‘altered’ only by a change in geography and
the passage of time, not by changes in parental affection and
responsibility.”342 Based on the child’s time in Germany, regardless of
the mother’s intentions or the father’s actions, the child’s habitual
residence was in Germany.343
This analysis is far superior to parental intent. Instead of entertaining
arguments over who did, said, or intended what, the court narrowed its
analysis to the two most important factors: time and geography. This test
focuses solely on the child’s integration into the environment, not a
parent’s ability to persuade a court of their intentions in the past. Thus,
the child-centered test takes a step towards the standard that this article
argues for: a time-centered test.
The Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed its child-centered test.344 After a family
moved back and forth between France and the United States for six years
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp.2d 1045, 1048 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1401–02.
Id at 1402.
Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol17/iss1/5

44

Heine: Home State, Cross-Border Custody

2011]

HOME STATE, CROSS-BORDER CUSTODY

53

and then split up, they argued their previous intentions in court to
establish their twin boys’ habitual residence.345 The District Court in
Ohio presiding over the case held that the child’s residence was not in
France because the parents lacked a shared intent.346
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, rejected the Mozes
test whose shared intent analysis “has ‘made seemingly easy cases hard
and reached results that are questionable at best.’”347 Instead, the court
focused “exclusively on the child’s experience” to determine habitual
residence.348
The court weighed the children’s last extended stay in the United States
before their short return to France, school attendance, and contact with
relatives in the United States.349 In contrast, the court noted little contact
with their father and French relatives while in France.350 Thus, the court
held that the evidence indicated habitual residence in the United States351
To establish jurisdiction over these custody disputes, the Sixth Circuit
ignores the parental intent, instead focusing on the time, place, and
relationships where the child resides.
These habitual residence
determinations are more concrete than under Mozes. Most importantly,
the Sixth Circuit determines habitual residence from the child’s point of
view, offering a better test than Mozes by focusing on the best interests
of the child.
(c)

Two-Pronged Child-Centered and Parental Intent Analysis

Courts in the Third and Eighth Circuits have attempted to balance those
two conflicting analyses. In the 1995 case Feder v. Evans-Feder, a
family had lived in Pennsylvania for three years when the father gained
employment in Australia.352 The mother had misgivings about moving to
Australia and did not intend to remain there permanently, but the family
moved there nonetheless.353 Six months later, the mother returned to

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id.
Id.
Id, (quoting Koch v. Koch, 416 F.Supp.2d 645, 651 (2006)).
Id. at 995.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 997.
Id.
Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 217-19 (3rd Cir. 1995).
Id. at 219.
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Pennsylvania with the child for an alleged vacation but filed for divorce
and custody in Pennsylvania.354
In overturning the District Court’s decision, the Third Circuit held that
the child’s habitual residence was Australia.355 The Court of Appeals
considered habitual residence to be a mixed question of law and fact.356
The court defined habitual residence as:
the place where [the child] has been physically present for an
amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a
“degree of settled purpose” from the child's perspective. . . . [A]
determination of whether any particular place satisfies this
standard must focus on the child and consists of an analysis of
the child's circumstances in that place and the parents' present,
shared intentions regarding their child's presence there.357
Thus, the Third Circuit analyzes the child’s circumstances and the
parent’s shared intentions.
In applying that definition, the court noted that the child was supposed to
live in Australia for the foreseeable future.358 The six months he spent
there were significant in his four years of life.359 Further, the parents had
enrolled the child in pre-school for the upcoming year.360 The couple’s
house and the father’s job in Australia indicated “the couple's settled
purpose to live as a family in [Australia].”361 Thus, the child’s habitual
residence was Australia.
This case demonstrates how courts applying this two-pronged test
primarily examine the child’s point of view. They then apply the facts
from the child’s viewpoint to secondarily determine the parents’ intent,
without putting much weight on either of one parent’s expressed intent at
trial. This palatable test focuses on a child’s interests but confuses with
parental intent.

354. Id.
355. Id at 224.
356. This determination, however, drew a dissenting opinion from Judge Sarokin, who reasoned
that the determination of habitual residence is a question of pure fact that an appellate court should
not review absent clear error. See id. at 227.
357. Id. at 224.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
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The Eighth Circuit has adopted a similar two-pronged analysis. In
Silverman v. Silverman, a couple moved to Israel with their two sons.362
The father claimed that the mother pushed for the move while she
described herself as “torn” about living in Israel.363 The boys enrolled in
school, where they performed well and learned Hebrew.364 However, the
parents’ relationship deteriorated.365 The couple found out that if the
couple got divorced by a Rabbinical Court in Israel, the father would
likely get custody.366
After eleven months, the father consented to the boys’ vacation with their
mother in the United States.367 At the airport in Israel, the mother
decided not to return.368 She then sought custody in Minnesota.369 In
hearing the father’s Hague return case on appeal, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that habitual residence was a legal standard
The court supported this
requiring the application of facts.370
determination with a policy argument that:
[i]f habitual residence [were] treated as a purely factual matter,
to be decided by an individual judge in individual circumstances
unique to each case, parents [would] never be able to guess, let
alone determine, whether they are at risk of losing custody by
allowing their children to visit overseas or in allowing them to
make international trips with an estranged spouse. With such
uncertainty, parents experiencing marital difficulties will be less
likely to allow children to travel with one parent and less likely
to allow children to maintain relationships with families in other
countries. Congress must have intended that there be enough
consistency in these cases to prevent such a result. Indeed, we
find it difficult to believe that American legislators intended to
launch American citizens into such unchartable waters.371

362. Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2003).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 890.
366. In Jewish divorce law – which is applied to all Jewish couples’ divorces in Israel – a
presumption exists that a parent will get custody over children of that parent’s sex if the child is over
the age of six. Generally speaking, divorce actions in Israel favor the husband. See Karin Carmit
Yefet, Unchaining the Agunot: Enlisting the Israeli Constitution in the Service of Women’s Marital
Freedom, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 441 (2009).
367. Silverman, supra note 362, at 890.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 891.
370. Id. at 896.
371. Id. at 896-97.
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True to form, the United States Court of Appeals wanted a concrete
habitual residence definition.
To reach this end, the court sculpted its habitual residence definition.
The court distinguished habitual residence from domicile, but stated that
a person may only have one habitual residence.372 Then, the court
adopted the two-pronged Feder test, examining the facts:
from the children's perspective, including the family's change in
geography along with their personal possessions and pets, the
passage of time, the family abandoning its prior residence and
selling the house, the application for and securing of benefits
only available to Israeli immigrants, the children's enrollment in
school, and, to some degree, both parents' intentions at the time
of the move to Israel.373
Here again, the court took the facts from the child’s point of view to
determine parental intent.
The Third Circuit has added a layer to habitual residence that further
divorced the analysis from parental intent. In Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk,
a divorced couple’s child lived with her mother in Finland.374 To
facilitate contact with the father in the United States, the mother let the
child become a permanent United States resident.375 At age eleven, the
child expressed wishes to move to the United States, and the parents
agreed to allow her to visit there for a summer.376
The child’s mother and stepfather did not challenge her wishes, so she
thought that she had “permission to move permanently to the United
States if she wished.”377 She bid farewell to her friends and family,
applied for a school in the United States, and left for the United States.378
In July, the child decided to stay in the United States, but the mother
withdrew her consent for the visit.379 In August, the mother sought her
daughter’s return.380

372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

Id.
Id. at 896-99.
Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 285 (3rd Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 285-86.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 294, 290.
Id.
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On appeal, the Third Circuit examined whether the mother’s permission
to go to the United States had indefinitely changed the daughter’s
habitual residence. In applying the two-pronged standard, the court
examined the child’s acclimatization and degree of settled purpose.381
In regard to the child’s acclimatization, the court noted that the daughter
took classes and participated in activities in the United States and
seemingly abandoned Finland.382 Though her time in the United States
was short, the parents’ agreed intention that she would choose her
residence lessened the time necessary to establish habitual residence.383
The overarching factor in this part of the test was the daughter’s
remarkable maturity.384 Thus, the court held that, from the child’s
perspective, the daughter had established significant roots in the United
States.385
In regard to the parent’s shared intent, the court altered the shared intent
consideration by making it relative to the child’s age, giving “somewhat
less weight to shared parental intent in cases involving older children . . .
capable of becoming ‘firmly rooted’ in a new country.”386 Considering
the daughter’s age and the shared intent to reside indefinitely, the court
held that the United States was the daughter’s habitual residence.387
Thus, this case adds the child’s maturity to the judicial definition of
habitual residence.
In theory, this two-pronged analysis provides some balance between the
opposing child-centered and parental intent standards.388 However, this
awkward balancing may be “more like judging whether a particular line
is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”389 After all, any parent knows
that what they intend for their child often differs from how their child
develops.

381. Id. at 294.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 296.
387. Id.
388. See Stephen E. Schwartz, The Myth of Habitual Residence: Why American Courts Should
Adopt the Delvoye Standard for Habitual Residence Under the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction,” 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 691 (2004); see also
Carshae DeAnn Davis, The Gitter Standard: Creating a Uniform Definition of Habitual Residence
Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 7 CHI. J. INT’L
L.321 (2006).
389. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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Instead, the objective standard of the Sixth Circuit rings truest to the
“factual determination” that the Abduction Convention envisions.390 The
circuit split, however, is likely to remain until the issue reaches the
United States Supreme Court.391 This federal circuit split notably has
analogous European Union counterparts.
2.

HABITUAL RESIDENCE APPROACHES IN EUROPEAN ABDUCTION
CONVENTION CASES

Courts in European Union countries seem comfortable with broad
notions of a fact-based test. At first glance, the recent CJ case A might
facilitate a uniform standard among Member State courts. However,
three reasons illustrate why a uniform definition remains out of reach.
First, A’s analysis preserves the term’s vagaries. Its mere recital of the
determination as relying on all of the facts in the case offers little
guidance, as subsequent United Kingdom cases show. Second, even if
European courts adopt a narrower reading of A, this may not apply to
Abduction Convention cases. After all, the Abduction Convention,
unlike BIIbis, is not a matter under CJ jurisdiction as applied to nonEuropean Union Member States. Thus, national courts may develop
different standards for habitual residence for European Union and nonEuropean Union cases. Courts have entrenched their own differing
habitual residence definitions in Abduction Convention cases for
decades. A brief analysis of habitual residence in Member States’ case
law exposes these differences.
(a)

Parental Intent: The United Kingdom Approach

Courts in the United Kingdom take an intent- and time-based approach
toward habitual residence under the Abduction Convention since the
seminal case before the United Kingdom’s supreme appellate court, the
House of Lords, which followed the national definition for habitual
residence. In the case In Re J.,392 the House of Lords largely followed the
Court of Appeals opinion that held that a young child’s habitual
residence relied on two factors: his custodial parent’s intent and presence
for an “appreciable period of time.”393

390. For an argument supporting the Sixth Circuit’s standard, see Tai Vivatvaraphol, Back to
Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence in International Child Abduction Cases Under
the Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3325 (2009).
391. See, e.g., L. Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Abduction Convention: In Search of a
Global Jurisprudence, 38 U.C. DAVIS L.R. 1049, 1065 (2005).
392. In Re J, [1990] 2 A.C. 562 (see also http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0002.htm).
393. Id.
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The appellate court cited Kapur v Kapur394 “for the proposition that
habitual residence must have an element of voluntariness and of
residence for settled purposes.”395 In that case, the court did not
determine whether the child had “habitual residence in [England] at the
moment when they arrived in [England] in circumstances in which they
had every intention of staying [t]here indefinitely and of settling
[t]here.”396 Instead, it examined whether the child retained habitual in
residence in Australia after his mother took him to England.397
Although acquiring a habitual residence takes time, a child can lose his
habitual residence in an instant.398 The House of Lords followed this
definition on appeal:
A person may cease to be habitually resident in country A in a
single day if he or she leaves it with a settled intention not to
return to it but to take up long-term residence in Country B
instead. Such a person cannot, however, become habitually
resident in country B in a single day. An appreciable period of
time and a settled intention will be necessary to enable him or
her to become so. During that appreciable period of time the
person will have ceased to be habitually resident in country A
but not yet have become habitually resident in country B.399
While the child might not have had an English habitual residence, he
could have lost his Australian habitual residence the moment his plane
touched down at Heathrow.
Further, the child’s young age made his habitual residence the same as
his mother’s. Thus, “the mother ceased to be habitually resident in
Western Australia from the moment when she left Western Australia
bound for England, with the intention of remaining permanently.”400
This case demonstrates the importance of intent in United Kingdom
Abduction Convention cases. This approach problematically allows a
parent to unilaterally terminate a habitual residence.
Further, the court removed factual analysis by looking solely at the
mother’s intent. Though it nodded towards the “appreciable period of
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

[1984] F.L.R. 922
[1990] 2 A.C. 562 (see also http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0002.htm).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, House of Lords [1990] AC 562.
Id.
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time” requirement – a vaguely constructed concept indeed – the court
eliminated time from the analysis by endorsing an immediate loss of
habitual residence. This deference to unilateral intent defied the interests
of the child and the left-behind parent. Nonetheless, this influential
decision focused squarely on parental intent.
The House of Lords revisited the issue in 1998. In the case In Re S., the
court distinguished from In Re J., finding a wrongful retention based on
custody rights awarded after the child’s removal.401 The House of Lords
adopted the opinion of Judge Butler-Sloss in the appellate court below
that:
‘[o]nce the child has been removed to another jurisdiction, the issue
whether the child has obtained a new habitual residence whilst in the care
of those who have not obtained an order or the agreement of others will
depend upon the facts. But a clandestine removal of the child on the
present facts would not immediately clothe the child with the habitual
residence of those removing him to that jurisdiction, although the longer
the actual residence of the child in the new jurisdiction without
challenge, the more likely the child would acquire the habitual residence
of those who have continued to care for the child without opposition.
Since, in the present case, the English court was seised [sic] of the case
within two days of the removal of the child, it is premature to say that the
child lost his habitual residence on leaving England or had acquired a
new habitual residence from his de facto carers [sic] on arrival in
Ireland.402
Thus, in this case, the House of Lords maintained its focus on parental
intent, analyzing whether the child spent time in the country without the
parent’s opposition. However, the court shifted its focus toward time in
the country, a subtle move towards objectivity in habitual residence.
Based on time, the child could not have established a new habitual
residence so quickly. Had the child spent more time in Ireland, the court
would have likely left him with his new primary caregiver with whom he
had the time to bond.
This focus on time, however, has not prevailed in United Kingdom case
law. Rather, the courts focus primarily on a parental intent test that
remains ingrained in United Kingdom jurisprudence, as the cases that
401. Re S. (A Minor) (Custody: Habitual
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1997/32.html).
402. Id.
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followed A have shown.403 Other European Union courts apply a childcentered approach.
(b)

Child-Centered: The Swedish and Danish Approach

Sweden and Denmark generally apply a child-centered test in analyzing
habitual residence, but also look to parental consent. Early lower
Swedish court decisions put inordinate weight on parental intent.404
However, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court changed that focus
in a case on habitual residence in Sweden in 1995 that involved a series
of abductions where the parent took the child back and forth between
Sweden and the United States, spurring litigation on both continents.405
The child eventually rested in Sweden where the Supreme
Administrative Court refused her return based on Swedish habitual
residence. The court noted that, as evidenced by Article 12, a child could
acquire habitual residence in a country after a wrongful removal.406 The
child spent two years in Sweden after one abduction and acquired
habitual residence in Sweden before the father re-removed her to the
United States.407 Sweden remained the habitual residence when the
mother removed the child again.408 Thus, the mother’s final removal was
not wrongful.
In this case, the court looked past any parental intent. Instead, the court
examined the facts from the child’s point of view to determine habitual
residence. Admittedly, the court had to consider time because the
parents’ only shared intent was to deprive the other’s parental rights.
This case shows how time is more reliable than subjective intent.
In a case before the same court in 2000, habitual residence conversely
turned on intent.409 A child had lived in Sweden with his unmarried
parents until the age of five.410 His mother then removed him against his

403. See supra, pp. 56 – 62.
404. The early Swedish focus on intent lives in infamy in the Gothenburg appellate court
decision on 14 November 1990. The Swedish court had a case with a mother who moved to
Netherlands with the intent to remain there. She had been there 12 days when the father removed
the children to Sweden. The Swedish court held that the children acquired a habitual residence in
the Netherlands after 12 days, based on the mother’s intent to remain.
405. See Regeringsrätten [RÅ] [Supreme Administrative Court] 1995-12-20 ref 99 (Swed.) and
Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1997).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Regeringsrätten [RÅ] [Supreme Administrative Court] 2001-09-12 ref 53 (Swed.).
410. Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011

53

39

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 17 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 5

62

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XVII

father’s wishes to England, intending to stay.411 One year later, the
mother let the child visit Sweden with the father, who retained him.412
Noting that a child can acquire a habitual residence after abduction, the
court held that the father had not acquiesced to the removal, despite his
failure to file a return petition in England.413 Notwithstanding time spent
in England, the court found a Swedish habitual residence because the
child was in Sweden for most of his life.414
This case demonstrates conflicting views on habitual residence among
signatories. The House of Lords would have likely held that the child’s
habitual residence shifted because “the mother continued to care for the
child without opposition.”415 The Swedish court, however, looked past
the father’s apparent acquiescence. These contrasting cases indicate the
lack of uniformity regarding parental intent, even outside of the United
States.
Unlike the previous cases’ unplanned shuttling between countries, some
parents agree to shuttle children back and forth by having the child
alternate residences. Under these arrangements, both parents intend for
the child to live periodically in two places but likely lack shared intent
regarding the child’s habitual residence. Predictably, one parent will
retain the child.
In another Swedish case, a shuttle custody agreement fell through.416 The
Swedish court looked to Swedish law, which stated that “a person who is
resident in a given state may be considered to have habitual residence in
this state if residence must be considered constant in view of the duration
of the period concerned and other circumstances.”417 However, the court
acknowledged that under its Abduction Convention definition, habitual
residence was:
primarily a matter of making an overall assessment of
circumstances which may be observed objectively such as the
length of sojourn, existing social ties, and other circumstances of
a personal or occupational nature which may indicate a more
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Re S [1998] AC 750.
416. J. v. J., Case No. 7505-1995, 9 May 1996, Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden.
417. “Om en person är bosatt i Sverige bör han (alltså) anses ha hemvist här, om bosättningen
med hänsyn till vistelsens varaktighet och omständigheterna i övrigt måste anses stadigvarande.” Id.
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permanent attachment to one country or the other. In the case of
a small child, the habitual residence of person who has custody,
and other family and social aspects, must be the decisive
factors.418
The child here had been in Sweden with her mother, a habitual resident
of Sweden, for over two years, she had adjusted to life in Sweden, and
was supposed to spend eight out of twelve years there.419 Thus, the court
applied a child-centered test.
On the one hand, this analysis was sound because it focused on the facts
of the case. Lacking agreed parental intent, the court had no choice but
to examine the most logical, practical and common sense method of
analyzing a child’s integration – time spent in the environment.
On the other hand, the decision leaves shuttle custody agreements
impotent in Sweden. Here, both parents expressly agreed to recurring
temporary absences, but the court ignored that agreement. As a result,
any parents must be wary of allowing their children to go to Sweden for
time-limited periods because the other parent could retain the child
despite express agreements.
This category of temporary presence demands protection under
international law. Instead of looking at the facts and parental intent,
international law should respect agreements to time-limited absences.
This and other categories, explained in Section V, would provide more
protection and certainty for families across borders.
Denmark similarly applies a child-centered analysis. Like Sweden,
earlier case law in Denmark muddled the habitual residence
determination by considering amount of time spent in the jurisdiction, in
addition to other factors. In a 1997 case with parallel proceedings in
New Jersey, the Denmark court refused a return from Denmark to the
United States.420

418. “Allmänt kan sägas att det vid en prövning av hemvistfrågan enligt konventionen i första
hand blir fråga om en helhetsbedömning av sådana objektivt konstaterbara förhållanden som en
vistelses längd, föreliggande sociala bindningar och andra förhållanden av personlig eller
yrkesmässig karaktär som kan peka på en mera stadigvarande anknytning till det ena eller andra
landet. När det gäller ett litet barn får vårdnadshavarens hemvist och de familjemässiga och sociala
förhållandena i övrigt avgörande betydelse.” Id.
419. Id.
420. V.L. 3. marts 1997, 11. afdeling, B-2511-96 (Vestre Landsret; High Court, Western
Division (Denmark); Superior Appellate Court).
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Primarily, the court recognized that the children spent a majority of their
lives in Denmark, as opposed to several months in the United States.421
In addition, the court noted that, according to the Danish national
register, the children were settled in Denmark throughout.422 Further, the
court noted the father’s request for the children to go to Denmark
contributed to the habitual residence determination.423 Thus, the court
considered parental intent and the facts.
The Danish court could have decided this case solely on the short time
spent in the United States compared with the major part of the children’s
lives in Denmark. The children’s registration on the national register
added little. Whether formally registered or not, children may still
integrate into a new environment. Additionally, parents may register
their children in a country for many reasons, but establishing habitual
residence should not be one of them.
Further, the court should not have focused on the father’s alleged
suggestion that the children go to Denmark. Even if he had, a suggestion
does not change a child’s integration.
Compared to other jurisprudence, this case shows a lack of uniformity.
In several cases above, courts have allowed one parent’s lack of consent
to block a child from acquiring a new habitual residence. In some
jurisdictions, a unilateral assertion of intention at trial has been enough to
preserve habitual residence. Here, however, the court turned this logic
on its head. This confuses the issues and defies attempts toward
uniformity in Abduction Convention cases.
In appellate cases, the Danish courts have focused on time. In one case,
a child spent the majority of his life in Denmark.424 The child’s time in
the Netherlands was too short to establish habitual residence. Thus, the
court focused on time of residence to determine habitual residence.
Similarly, time was the crucial factor in a 2002 Danish appellate case.425
In that case, however, a time-limited agreement preserved the child’s
Danish habitual residence. The child had lived in England for her first
seven years when her mother agreed to allow the child to stay in
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Ø.L.K. 23. juni 1998, 16. afd., B-1391-98 (Østre Landsret: High Court, Eastern Division
(Denmark);Appellate Court).
425. Ø.L.K, 5. April 2002, 16. afdeling, B-409-02 (Østre Landsret (High Court, Eastern
Division, Denmark)).
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Denmark for one year with her father. After the year, the father retained
the child. The Danish court honored the time-limited agreement and thus
ordered the child’s return to England.
This outcome seems appropriate. Parents should be able to protect
themselves while affording their children time with their other parent and
a different culture. Without guidance in the Abduction Convention,
however, parents will enjoy protection at the whim of national courts.
The Danish courts put great weight on time in habitual residence
determinations. While they have not set a specific time limit, time
provides the major factor in habitual residence determinations.
Moreover, the courts will respect a time-limited agreement to preserve
habitual residence when a child temporarily leaves a habitual residence.
The following questions remain: Why leave these particulars to the
national courts? Why not include concrete time limits and categorical
exceptions within international family law?
(c)

Temporal Standards: the Austrian and German Approaches

The Supreme Court of Austria has contributed a concrete habitual
residence determination standard for Abduction Convention cases. In
Austria, six months’ presence generally establishes habitual residence, as
evidenced by a 2003 case, in which a child had spent time in Austria and
Serbia.426 At the heart of the case was whether the child’s time in Serbia
had established habitual residence. The child spent five months in
Austria, eight months in Serbia, and seven months in Austria when the
father took the children to Serbia.427 The following month, the mother
took the child back to Austria. The father then sought a return.
The supreme Austrian court defined habitual residence428 as identical to
its 1996 Convention definition in Austria.429 The court held that, in
general, six months presence establishes habitual residence, regardless of
parental intent.430 Because the child had been in Austria for more than
426. Ob121/03g, Supreme Court of Austria, 30/10/2003 (see also http://www.incadat.com/
index.cfm?fuseaction=convtext.showFull&code=548&lng=1).
427. Id.
428. Demgemäß kommt es für die Ermittlung des "gewöhnlichen Aufenthaltes" darauf an, ob
jemand tatsächlich einen Ort zum Mittelpunkt seines Lebens, seiner wirtschaftlichen Existenz und
seiner sozialen Beziehung macht. Der Aufenthalt bestimmt sich ausschließlich nach tatsächlichen
Umständen.
429. Der Begriff des gewöhnlichen Aufenthaltes im Sinn des Art 3 des Übereinkommens ist
gleich auszulegen wie in den diesen Begriff enthaltenden Bestimmungen der JN und des Haager
Minderjährigenschutzübereinkommens (1 Ob 220/02p)
430. Die Dauer des Aufenthalts ist für sich allein kein ausschlaggebendes Moment, doch ist im
Allgemeinen nach einer Aufenthaltsdauer von sechs Monaten anzunehmen, dass ein “gewöhnlicher
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six months followed by at most three weeks in Serbia,431 Austria was the
habitual residence.
The Austrian standard seems to provide the clearest-cut habitual
residence standard in Europe. Instead of positioning judges as child
development analysts or parental mind readers, the Austrian courts need
only look at their calendars and, based on objective facts, count whether
the child spent six months in the country. If so, this establishes habitual
residence.
The standard, however, causes problems in temporary presence
situations. The Austrian courts would not be justified in finding Austrian
habitual residence for a Serbian child who spent a year in an Austrian
boarding school. Thus, a six-month standard requires exception.
Germany has also applied a concrete time standard. The German
Constitutional Court heard a re-abduction case in 1998, acknowledging a
general rule that six months’ presence will establish habitual residence.432
In that case, the children had lived their entire lives in Germany. The
parents had joint custody when, in July 1997, the mother removed the
children from Germany to France with a pending German divorce order.
After a French trial court denied his Hague petition, the father’s agents
removed the children from France back to Germany in March 1998.
The mother sought the children’s return, which the trial court denied.433
The mother appealed, and the appellate court reversed. Then, the father
appealed to the Constitutional Court based on his constitutional right to
family life in the German Grundgesetz.434
The Constitutional Court denied the return but nonetheless found that the
child had obtained a French habitual residence. Despite the nature of the
removal, the court’s determination was purely factual. The court
considered whether the child achieved social inclusion, which, as a “rule
of thumb” in the German federal courts, occurred after six months.435
Aufenthalt” vorliegt. Ein gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt kann auch gegen den Willen eines
Sorgeberechtigten begründet werden, weil es auf den tatsächlichen Daseinsmittelpunkt ankommt (1
Ob 220/02p; 2 Ob 80/03h; vgl auch RIS-Justiz RS0109515).
431. Id.
432. 2 BvR 1206/98, Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany), 29
October 1998.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 32 (“In der Rechtsprechung werde ‘als Faustregel’ häufig eine Aufenthaltsdauer von
sechs Monaten angenommen, welche der Bundesgerichtshof im Regelfall als angemessene
Zeitspanne anerkenne.”)
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Simply put, the child had been in France for more than six months and
thus acquired habitual residence in France. These cases indicate a
temporal standard in at least two European Union Member States.
(d)

A Two-Pronged Analysis: The French Approach

France’s Supreme Court has heard several cases on this issue.436
Evolving case law reveals the uncertainty that habitual residence cases
retain. In the seminal 1992 Abduction Convention decision, the Cour de
cassation applied a parental shared intent analysis.437 In that case, a
young child had been living in Canada for a year when the family visited
France at the beginning of the summer. At the end of the summer, the
father stayed in France with the child, and the mother returned to
Canada. In September, the mother sought the child’s return.
The father argued that the move was permanent. However, he could not
produce evidence to convince the Cour de cassation that the mother
intended a permanent move to France. Thus, because the parents lacked
a shared intent, the child retained habitual residence in Canada.
This case reached the right result, but it could have done so without
appealing to the supreme appellate court with two improvements to
Abduction Convention. First, a time-based standard for habitual
residence, if more than three months, would have objectively preserved
habitual residence in Canada. Second, a categorical definition of
“temporary absence” to prevent children from acquiring habitual
residence during vacations would likely have streamlined the mother’s
arguments. Unfortunately, these standards do not exist in private
international family law. As a result, the French courts have consistently
relied on parental intent.
In another case, the Court used a two-pronged analysis: the
circumstances surrounding the child and the father’s intent that the child
live in England.438 In that 2006 decision, the Cour de cassation held that
the children had residence in England after a year because the children
enrolled in school, the mother had a job in England, and the residence
was not provisional. Furthermore, the father did not previously

436. See, e.g., Cass Civ 1ère 16/12/1992 (N° de pourvoi : 91-13119); Cour de cassation
[Cass.][Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e ch., November 14, 2006 (N° de pourvoi : 05-15692).
437. The Cour de Cassation is the supreme appellate court in France for non-public law cases.
Cass Civ 1ère 16/12/1992 (N° de pourvoi : 91-13119).
438. Cour de cassation [Cass.][Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e ch., November 14, 2006
(N° de pourvoi : 05-15692).
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challenge the children’s move to England and visited them there twice.
Thus, the French court has examined objective facts and parental intent.
C.

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING HABITUAL RESIDENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

International case law demonstrates the inconsistent treatment of habitual
residence by courts across the globe. While the Abduction Convention
strives for unanimity, courts determine habitual residence on their own
terms. Some look to parental intent, some look to time, some look to the
child’s integration, and some weigh all of the facts in the case. Courts
have necessarily embedded their own brands of habitual residence as a
result of the Abduction Convention’s limited guidance, a shortcoming
that the 1996 Convention retains. Parents thus face a lack of uniformity
among international courts. They further face uncertain determinations
in the courts that lack a time-bound and categorical approach to habitual
residence. Private international law therefore demands a uniform,
concrete standard for jurisdiction in cross-border cases.
V.

TIME FOR A TEMPORAL AND CATEGORICAL STANDARD
FOR JURISDICTION

A uniform concrete standard is well within reach. Until the Hague
Conference, the National Conference, and the European Union unify the
international standard, domestic courts must lead the way in applying
jurisdictional standards. This article presents a two-fold solution to
concretize court decisions in this area of law.
First, private international law should adopt a temporal standard for
habitual residence. A temporal standard will promote the best interests
of children, increase legal certainty, and promote uniformity. This type
of standard has some precedent, as international family law uses strict
time limits for jurisdiction in some cases. Moreover, temporal standards
have already worked in some countries’ jurisdictional schemes. For
these reasons, cross-border jurisdiction should embrace a temporal
standard.
Second, international family law should establish categories of
temporary presence to define temporary moves. United States, European
Union, and international family law each generally lacks specific
guidelines regarding temporary presence.
By providing precise
definitions, parents and children would enjoy more opportunities to
exercise their rights to contact.
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Though this two-part solution will not provide a panacea for all crossborder custody disputes, it furnishes a more uniform, autonomous, and
legally certain standard for jurisdiction. Until private international law
instruments concretely define habitual residence, courts should adopt this
approach to serve cross-border families and, most importantly, the best
interests of children.
A.

A TEMPORAL HABITUAL RESIDENCE STANDARD

For most cross-border cases, a temporal standard for habitual residence
would concretely determine habitual residence. Such a standard would
serve three crucial purposes. Primarily, a temporal standard will best
serve children’s interests because time is the central factor toward
integration. Children should remain in the environment where they
enjoy stability, support, and integration. Courts with close proximity to
the child’s integrated environment have better access to evidence of the
child’s best interests. Granted, many factors will contribute to a child’s
integration, including schooling, family ties, social networks, and
linguistic knowledge.
However, these factors require the most
fundamental catalyst of integration – time.
Second, and closely related to the best interests of the child, a temporal
standard will maximize legal certainty in these cases. Legal uncertainty
has negative effects on families in these situations both in practical and
legal terms. From the practical perspective, uncertainty requires more
legal help, which means more costs. These costs include monetary
expenditure, which one parent, both parents, or the state must pay.
These costs are also non-monetary. Parents who struggle through
litigation have less time to care for their children, move on with their
lives, and foster healthful environments. Instead of improving prospects
for employment, personal relationships, and healthy living, parents suffer
the stresses of attorneys, courts, and dysfunctional ex-partnerships.
Considering the flurry of child abduction-related cases that have made it
all the way to the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”),439 parents
can delay proceedings for years – a move that in one recent case
prompted the ECHR to determine that, considering the lengthy duration
of pending litigation, a child’s rights would be harmed if he was returned
439. See, e.g., Trdan and C. v. Slovenia, 28708/06 2010 [ECHR] 1978 (7 December 2010);
Sakewitz v. Germany, 21369/07 [2010] ECHR 1910 (2 November 2010); Van Den Berg and Sarri v.
the Netherlands, 7239/08 [2010] ECHR 1947 (2 November 2010); Raban v. Romania, 25437/08
[2010] ECHR 1625 (26 October 2010); MM v. the United Kingdom, 24029/07 [2010] ECHR 1588 (6
October 2010); Sylvester v. Austria, 36812/97 [2010] ECHR 1447 (15 September 2010); Neulinger
and Shuruk v. Switzerland, 41615/07 [2010] ECHR 1053 (6 July 2010).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2011

61

43

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 17 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 5

70

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XVII

to his parent.440 As seen, the stress of litigation will likely take its toll on
the very people international family law should protect: children.
With a temporal standard, parents would escalate litigation in fewer
cases. Instead of weighing many subjective factors, courts would make a
factual determination – time in country. Thus, a temporal standard
would provide practical benefits by increasing legal certainty.
From the legal deterrent perspective, uncertainty incentivizes wrongful
removals. If parents can find sympathetic national courts that may
decide in their favor after abductions, parents will be more likely to
abduct children. Subjective tests allow the possibility that if parents
abduct, a court will loosely apply the habitual residence standard. A
temporal standard, however, offers less room for courts’ discretion.
Thus, a temporal standard will deter child abductions.
Finally, a temporal standard would better serve the international family
law framework by adding uniformity – and thus legitimacy – to crossborder custody cases. Despite international family law’s steps toward
uniformity, the current lack of uniformity communicates a sense of
arbitrariness in international family law. The current legal standard has
resulted in varying judicial application with too much discretion for
uniformity.
The best way to increase uniformity among national court decisions is by
relying on the clearest objective factor – time. All stakeholders –
parents, courts, lawyers, governments, and communities – would thus
play by the same rules.
Time toward integration is an admittedly blunt tool with which to gauge
a child’s integration, but social science can help. Research on child
integration would inform courts as to how much time leads to
integration. If social science determines that children of different ages
integrate after different periods, courts could craft an age-based temporal
standard. Experts in child development are best qualified to set such
standards. Several countries have decided that six months’ presence in a
country assures integration in an environment. This six-month period
provides a tested standard to determine habitual residence.
A temporal jurisdictional standard is not an entirely novel concept. As
we have seen, laws in the United States and courts in Austria and
Germany apply a six-month standard for jurisdiction in child custody
440.

Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, 41615/07 [2010] ECHR 1053 (6 July 2010).
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cases. In international family law, time also exists. Most notably,
abduction cases under the Abduction Convention and BIIbis preserve
jurisdiction in abduction cases for one year after abductions.
Additionally, BIIbis preserves jurisdiction over rights of access for three
months after legal removals. European Union laws regarding family
reunification also apply strict time restrictions.441 Thus, a temporal
standard for primary jurisdiction would build on a concept that already
protects children in some cross-border situations.
In sum, a temporal jurisdictional standard in international family law
would protect children en masse by increasing legal certainty and
uniformity in cross-border custody cases. For these reasons, a timebased standard should apply for most international custody disputes.
B.

A CATEGORICAL TEMPORARY PRESENCE STANDARD

The time-based standard would not be appropriate in temporary presence
cases. Under the current framework, however, courts have little
guidance regarding temporary presence. Though the negotiations of the
1996 Convention indicate that temporary absences will not establish a
habitual residence, the 1996 Convention leaves courts to their own
devices to determine whether a move was temporary. Courts can begin
fashioning specific guidelines surrounding temporary presence with
subcategories and evidentiary requirements to show temporary presence.
As seen above, these determinations often turn on parental intent –
usually only one parent’s intent. When courts rely on one parent’s word,
they risk making arbitrary, erroneous, or biased decisions on criteria that
may have little to do with the child’s actual integration. Worse still,
some courts blatantly disregard agreements between parties stipulating
temporary presence. This leaves parents with little security when they
allow their children to travel abroad.
That uncertainty deters parents from allowing their children to travel
abroad. Moreover, this uncertainty deprives valuable parent-child
contact, in violation of children’s human rights to family life in almost
all countries.442 Categorical definitions for temporary presence offer a
solution.

441. See Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family
reunification [2003] O.J. L251 12.
442. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child at art. 7, 20 November 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S 3.
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Children have temporarily residences for various, but limited, reasons.
For example, a child’s presence is temporary when it is for the child’s
education, a parent’s education, a parent’s time-limited employment,
shuttle custody arrangements, vacation, summer camp, visitation,
emergency supervision, and medical services. If the primary purpose of
the travel is any of these reasons, then, with sufficient evidence, courts
should presume that the presence was temporary.
Each of these types of temporary presence will have some evidentiary
support. Instead of divining parental intent, courts could require
evidence that supports temporariness. For example, courts could require
parents to produce enrollment paperwork, travel itineraries,
correspondences, or medical bills. Such evidence could reliably indicate
temporary presence and simultaneously provide parents with ways to
protect their children when sending them abroad.
Further, parents should be able to build in some protection when they
allow their children to reside temporarily with parents abroad. Courts
should recognize party agreements that stipulate a limited stay. If the
parent abroad retains the child past the agreed time, then the other parent
would have one year past that time to file a Hague return petition. Thus,
categories of temporary presence would provide parents with protection
when allowing their children to go abroad.
In any event, these categorical definitions of temporary absence should
not extend for unreasonably long periods. Specific categories could have
built-in time limits to account for the child’s potential integration despite
parental intent. For example, a category for vacation could include a
three-month time limit so that parents could not simply argue that an
extended presence was a vacation. Such temporal limits would add
objectivity to temporary presence.
If a move is for an indefinite amount of time, then the general temporal
standard should apply. Certain evidentiary standards of indefinite
presence, such as return travel arrangements, retention of a previous
residence, or enrollment in school, could add a measure of certainty.
Procedures surrounding these time-limited moves could further protect
parent and child rights. Signatory states could collaborate on form
agreements that parents could use and register with the Central
Authorities when the children go abroad. Parents could simply access
these forms online and enjoy peace of mind knowing that courts would
respect these agreements.
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In sum, a temporal standard for child custody jurisdiction that
categorically defines temporary presence would best serve the best
interests of children. Because habitual residence presently lacks
definition, courts should adopt such a standard in international family
law.
C.

CONCLUSION

This tour of two continents has outlined jurisdiction in cross-border custody
cases and the body of law that has increasingly developed over the past
several decades. Jurisdictional determinations have room for improvement
under United States, European Union, and international law.
United States domestic law applies a time-based jurisdictional standard.
The UCCJEA boasts several bright line tests that foster consistency.
Two primary weaknesses in United States law are temporary absence’s
breadth and the rigid application of requirements that disadvantages
foreign parties and foreign courts. International family law can solve
both problems with categorical definitions of temporary presence and
uniform jurisdictional standards. At its core, however, the UCCJEA
offers parties a certain and uniform six-month jurisdictional standard.
In Europe, parties face a different situation. Unlike the rigid rules in the
United States, the CJ has endorsed an all-the-facts-in-the-case standard,
leaving parties with less certainty or predictability in front of foreign
judges. Despite the recent ruling in A, parties and attorneys must rely on
guesswork and extended litigation in close cases. Thus, a refined
temporal standard would better solve the lack of uniformity and
uncertainty in European Union family law.
In international law, the habitual residence standard is even less certain.
In the United States, a three-way split complicates the analysis. In
Europe, a similar split among European Union courts has left habitual
residence determinations largely dependent on the jurisprudence of the
court seized. Thus, jurisdiction hides among the wavering habitual
residence definitions of national courts.
Considering the impressive work of the National Conference, the
European Union, and the Hague Conference towards modernizing and
streamlining jurisdiction, they should combine their efforts to fashion a
concrete definition of habitual residence. Until these bodies work
together, courts will be unable to inject uniformity and certainty in
determining jurisdiction. A more synthesized definition of habitual
residence would save parents’ and courts’ resources which, in turn,
would ultimately promote the best interests of children.
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